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ABSTRACT 
  Drawing on three case studies, this Essay contends that the proper 
role of law in managing uses of traditional knowledge is highly 
contextual. In some settings, distributive justice, cultural diversity, and 
group identity formation would be promoted by according indigenous 
groups more power to control or to benefit from uses of knowledge 
developed and sustained by their members, while in other settings, 
respect for individual autonomy and the promotion of semiotic 
democracy counsel against providing the groups that power. The Essay 
then outlines two alternative legal frameworks, either of which could 
accommodate this complex combination of competing values.  The first 
would incorporate in a multilateral treaty a set of provisions that, by 
increasing the risk that unauthorized use of traditional knowledge 
would result in forfeiture of intellectual property rights, would put 
pressure on private firms to accede to reasonable requests made by the 
governments of developing countries and by representatives of 
indigenous groups. The second would augment and harness public 
discourse concerning the morality of particular uses of traditional 
knowledge by creating a disclosure obligation, disconnected from 
intellectual property law, analogous to the labelling requirements 
commonly imposed on the producers of food, clothing, and drugs. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 1512 
I.  Representative Controversies ........................................................ 1513 
A. Quassia Amara ................................................................... 1514 
 
Copyright © 2018 by William Fisher. 
 † WilmerHale Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard University. This Essay was 
first presented as the inaugural David L. Lange Lecture on Intellectual Property at Duke 
University Law School on March 23, 2017. I am grateful for the comments of James Boyle, Arti 
Rai, Jerome Reichman, and David Lange himself. Subsequent drafts have benefitted from 
suggestions made by Anupam Chander, Justin Hughes, Ruth Okediji, Madhavi Sunder, the 
participants in a Faculty Summer Workshop at Harvard Law School, and the participants in a 
workshop at the 2017 meeting of the European Policy for Intellectual Property Association. 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1512  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
B. Wandjina Spirit Images ..................................................... 1520 
C. Tibetan Rugs ....................................................................... 1528 
II.  The Law ........................................................................................... 1536 
III.  The Principal Justifications .......................................................... 1542 
A. Labor ................................................................................... 1543 
B. Corrective Justice ............................................................... 1545 
C. Utilitarianism ...................................................................... 1547 
IV.  Cultural Theory ............................................................................ 1549 
V.  Solutions .......................................................................................... 1565 
A. Delegation ........................................................................... 1566 
B. Mandatory Disclosure—Modified ................................... 1568 
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1578 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To what extent, if any, should the law enable indigenous groups to 
control or benefit from uses of knowledge those groups have 
developed? This Essay offers two alternative answers to that 
notoriously difficult question. 
Part I describes three recent controversies in which the question 
has arisen. These controversies illustrate the diversity of interests and 
values implicated by struggles over traditional knowledge and identify 
circumstances that have resulted in satisfactory resolution of those 
struggles and thus may provide seeds for legal reform. 
Part II sketches the laws currently in force throughout the world 
that determine the relative rights of the parties to such disputes. 
Part III summarizes and evaluates the principal arguments that 
scholars and activists have offered for enhanced legal protection of the 
kinds of knowledge at issue in such cases. It concludes that, even taking 
as given the normative premises on which those arguments are 
founded, none withstands scrutiny. 
Part IV contends that a cultural theory of intellectual property 
could provide the foundation for a more promising defense of 
enhanced legal protection. Specifically, it argues that, under some 
circumstances, using the legal system to discourage unauthorized uses 
of traditional knowledge would help cultivate a more just and 
attractive culture. 
Part V draws on the cultural theory to suggest two legal regimes, 
either of which might be used to manage struggles over traditional 
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knowledge in ways that accommodated the complex competing 
considerations at stake.  
I.  REPRESENTATIVE CONTROVERSIES 
For the purposes of this Essay, traditional knowledge is defined as 
understanding or skill developed and preserved by the members of an 
indigenous group concerning either actual or potential socially 
beneficial uses of natural resources (such as plants, animals, or 
components thereof) or cultural practices (such as rituals, narratives, 
poems, images, designs, clothing, fabrics, music, or dances).1 More 
expansive definitions of traditional knowledge can be readily 
imagined, but they would encompass territory outside the zone of 
plausible legal intervention and thus can be ignored for the purposes 
of this Essay.  
Controversies over the legal status of traditional knowledge 
typically arise when companies or individuals in developed countries 
make use of such knowledge, without permission, in ways that either 
generate profits that are not shared with the members of the relevant 
indigenous group or offend members of the group. The groups and 
interests that have been involved in such controversies in the past are 
diverse. It would be impossible to catalogue them in a single essay. 
However, developing a sensible legal regime to handle such 
controversies requires some sense of the people and issues they affect. 
Set forth below are summaries of three illustrative recent episodes that 
thus far have received little attention. Shorter summaries of some 
better known controversies will be provided in conjunction with the 
normative arguments considered in Parts III and IV.  
 
 1 This definition is a modified version of the one developed by Stephen Munzer and Kal 
Raustiala. See Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property 
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 38 (2009). For examples of 
other definitions in the same vein, see David R. Hansen, Protection of Traditional Knowledge: 
Trade Barriers and the Public Domain, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 757, 759 (2010–2011); Towards 
the Establishment of a Regional Framework for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 
Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic Resources in the Caribbean Region, WIPO (2009), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtk_kin_08/wipo_grtk_kin_08_caribbean_
brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3NW-RXLE]. For reasons that will become apparent, the 
definition employed here intentionally lumps together kinds of knowledge that many scholars 
now differentiate. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, Cultural Expression, and the 
Siren’s Call of Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1215, 1216–18 (2013) (examining the differences 
between the terms “[t]raditional knowledge” and “traditional cultural expression[]”). 
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A. Quassia Amara 
Each year, roughly 200 million people suffer from malaria and 
roughly 500,000 die from it.2 Currently, the standard treatment for 
malaria is artemisinin combination therapy, which is usually effective 
in treating the disease.3 Unfortunately, for various reasons, the 
resistance of malaria parasites to artemisinin is increasing.4 Partly as a 
result, scientists and pharmaceutical companies have begun exploring 
alternative therapies with greater urgency. 
One promising source of such alternatives is the set of herbal 
remedies that have been used for centuries by indigenous groups to 
combat malaria. A wide variety of plants are employed in such 
remedies. One recent survey identified 102 species in use in Nigeria 
alone5; another identified 99 in use in a single state in northern Brazil.6  
Among those plants is Quassia amara—sometimes known as 
bitterroot. Its medicinal power has been appreciated for centuries. 
Indeed, in 1762 botanist Carl Linnaeus gave the plant its scientific 
name, allegedly to honor Graman Quassi, who, while a slave in 
Surinam, identified its effectiveness in combating fever and intestinal 
parasites.7 
For a biochemist, determining which of the plants employed in 
traditional remedies have some therapeutic benefits with respect to 
malaria is relatively straightforward.8 Determining which is most 
efficacious—or, more precisely, which contains compounds that could 
be most efficacious—is more difficult and time-consuming. Some 
assistance in determining which of the many extant traditional 
 
 2. Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: Malaria, WHO, http://www.who.int/gho/
malaria/en/ [https://perma.cc/ZPX3-YD7R].  
 3. Overview of Malaria Treatment, WHO (Mar. 18, 2017), http://www.who.int/malaria/
areas/treatment/overview/en/ [https://perma.cc/A46A-XTFX].  
 4. For discussion of the causes and implications of this trend, see WILLIAM W. FISHER, III 
& TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE 
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming 2018), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/
Infection.htm [https://perma.cc/545P-58X8]. 
 5. See Joseph O. Adebayo & Antoniana U. Krettli, Potential Antimalarials from Nigerian 
Plants: A Review, 133 J. ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 289, 292–94 (2011). 
 6. See William Milliken, Traditional Antimalarial Medicine in Roraima, Brazil, 51 ECON. 
BOTANY 212, 217 (1997). 
 7. The contested origins of the name—and the uncertainty pertaining to its connection to 
Quassi—are summarized in John Uri Lloyd, Quassia Amara, 19 W. DRUGGIST 7, 7–8 (1897). 
 8. See Antoniana U. Krettli, Joseph O. Adebayo & Luisa G. Krettli, Testing of Natural 
Products and Synthetic Molecules Aiming at New Antimalarials, 10 CURRENT DRUG TARGETS 
261, 269 (2009).  
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remedies are worth investigating can be obtained by consulting the 
current members of the indigenous groups that developed, refined, and 
maintained them.9 
French Guiana is an especially attractive place to conduct a study 
of this sort, partly because the endemic prevalence of malaria there is 
very high10 and partly because several indigenous groups in the country 
have developed traditional plant-based preventive and therapeutic 
systems for controlling the disease. (Perhaps for those reasons, 
although the infection rate is high, the death rate in Guiana from 
malaria is remarkably low—fewer than five cases a year.) Attracted by 
these conditions, in 2003 a group of researchers associated with the 
Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD),11 based in 
Marseille, conducted a study of the “knowledge[,] attitudes and 
practices” in four carefully selected villages to ascertain how the 
residents dealt with malaria.12  
The researchers interviewed a total of 117 adults. Thirty-five 
identified themselves as Paliku; fourteen self-identified as Galibi; 
seven were European by background; fourteen were Brazilian; one was 
Hmong; and forty-six were Creole.13 The first two of these clusters are 
members of indigenous groups. The people commonly known as the 
Paliku or Palikur have been living in the area just north of the mouth 
of the Amazon River for centuries.14 Beginning in the sixteenth 
century, the Portuguese colonists abused them—enslaving some, 
killing others, driving still others inland. The French colonists to the 
 
 9. See generally MERLIN WILLCOX, GERARD BODEKER, PHILIPPE RASOANAIVO & 
JONATHAN ADDAE-KYEREME, TRADITIONAL HERBAL MEDICINES FOR MODERN TIMES: 
TRADITIONAL MEDICINAL PLANTS AND MALARIA (2004) (exploring traditional medicines). 
 10. B. Carme & C. Venturin, Le paludisme dans les Ameriques, 59 MÉDECINE TROPICALE 
298 (1999); WHO, World Health Statistics 2011: Global Health Indicator Tables and Footnotes 
(2011), http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2011/en/ [https://perma.cc/PA9J-4RXZ] (providing 
relevant data in xls format). 
 11. For information concerning IRD, see INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE POUR LE 
DÉVELOPPEMENT (Nov. 27, 2017), https://en.ird.fr [https://perma.cc/QKW5-74NW]. 
 12. See M. Vigneron, Xavier Deparis, Eric Deharo & Geneviève Bourdy, Antimalarial 
Remedies in French Guiana: A Knowledge Attitudes and Practices Study, 98 J. 
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 351, 351–52 (2005). The villages were Saül, Ouanary, Saint-Georges, 
and Kamuyene. Id. at 353.  
 13. Id. at 354. 
 14. For the best source of information on the Palikur, see Artionka Capiberibe, Palikur: 
Introduction, POVOS INDÍGENAS NO BRASIL (Feb. 2012), 
https://pib.socioambiental.org/en/povo/palikur [https://perma.cc/JYR3-Y2HW]. For an extensive 
bibliography, see Artionka Capiberibe, Palikur: Sources of Information, POVOS INDÍGENAS NO 
BRASIL (Feb. 2012), https://pib.socioambiental.org/en/povo/palikur/1764 [https://perma.
cc/YS7H-SPWK]. 
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north of the Portuguese settlements treated the Paliku people 
somewhat better, which helps explains why, today, roughly one third 
of the group’s members live in French Guiana instead of Brazil. 
Traditionally, the Paliku supported themselves by fishing, typically 
with bow and arrow; hunting of tapir, deer, pig, cutia, and monkeys; 
and horticulture, primarily of manioc. Today, some have begun to 
participate in the market economy. The first language of most is 
Parikwaki, part of the Arawak family of languages.  
The Galibi, also known as the Kalina, have lived in the region at 
least as long.15 Prior to the arrival of European colonists, the Galibi 
were numerous and occupied much of the area between the mouths of 
the Amazon and Orinoco Rivers. Genocide and disease reduced the 
population sharply, but substantial numbers still reside in French 
Guiana. Most speak Kali’na, a member of the Cariban family of 
languages, although some of the youngest generation have ceased to 
do so. 
From their interviews with these various groups, the IRD 
researchers concluded the following: most residents of the four villages 
employed a combination of traditional and modern medicines to treat 
malaria; twenty-seven different plants were used in the traditional 
medicines; and of those plants, Quassia amara (alone or in combination 
with other plants) was used most often and thought to be the most 
effective.16 
These findings encouraged the same researchers—and others 
aware of their work—to try to isolate the compound within Quassia 
amara that had proven so effective. Discovery of the active ingredient 
occurred in stages. The first wave of research concluded that the key 
compound was Simalikalactone D.17 A second wave, however, found 
that Simalikalactone D was less effective or more toxic than previously 
 
 15. No single source provides comprehensive information concerning the Galibi. For 
background, see Lux Vidal, Galibi do Oiapoque: Introduction, POVOS INDÍGENAS NO BRASIL 
(Jan. 2000), https://pib.socioambiental.org/en/povo/galibi-do-oiapoque [https://perma.cc/JL4D-
8EUH]; People Name: Galibi Karibi of French Guiana, PEOPLE GROUPS (Dec. 2, 2017), 
http://www.peoplegroups.org/Explore/groupdetails.aspx?peid=16332 [https://perma.cc/A26U-
F7QG]; Indigenous Communities from French Guiana: Kalina, NATIVE PLANET, 
http://www.nativeplanet.org/indigenous/ethnicdiversity/latinamerica/frenchguiana/indigenous_d
ata_frenchguiana_kalina.shtml [https://perma.cc/X2XN-TB9Q]; Kalina People, WIKIPEDIA 
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalina_people [https://perma.cc/QG64-E86J]. 
 16. Vigneron et al., supra note 12, at 357–59. 
 17. See Stéphane Bertani et al., Simalikalactone D is Responsible for the Antimalarial 
Properties of an Amazonian Traditional Remedy Made with Quassia Amara L. (Simaroubaceae), 
108 J. ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 155, 156 (2006). 
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thought and that the decisive ingredient was a close cousin, 
Simalikalactone E.18 
The latter discovery prompted the researchers to seek patent 
protection for the compound. A U.S. Patent was issued in 2013, and an 
EPO Patent followed in 2015.19 The claims in both are broad. They 
include: 
A molecule corresponding to formula 1 below: 
1. A medicament comprising the molecule of formula 1 as 
claimed in claim 1, and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier. 
2. The medicament as claimed in claim 2, for reducing the 
transmission of malaria.20 
Why exactly did the researchers seek legal control over the 
molecule and its use? They subsequently explained their motives as 
follows: 
National research and innovation policies in most countries, including 
France, have strong expectations concerning knowledge transfer 
activities by universities and research institutes. Performance on 
these matters is usually measured by indicators such as the number of 
patents filed and license agreements signed, and the overall royalties 
 
 18. See Nadja Cachet et al., Antimalarial Activity of Simalikalactone E, a New Quassinoid 
from Quassia Amara L. (Simaroubaceae), 53 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 
4393, 4393 (2009). 
 19. U.S. Patent No. 8,604,220 (filed June 17, 2010); Eur. Patent No. 2,443,126 (filed June 17, 
2010). The claims in the two patents are slightly different. The language set forth in the text is 
derived from the U.S. version. 
 20. U.S. Patent No. 8,604,220 col. 13 1. 24–27 (filed June 17, 2010). 
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and contract research collaboration revenues. These indicators are 
also commonly used by funding agencies as a measure of the overall 
quality of the applicant. Furthermore, concerning medical innovation, 
it is generally accepted that strong intellectual property protection is 
a mandatory warranty in order to obtain a return on the investments 
necessary to launch new drugs on the market. With this in mind, SkE 
was patented in 2009 in the hope that a pharmaceutical company 
could support the expensive toxicological studies and preclinical 
evaluations necessary for the development of a new antimalarial.21 
Both in the publications reporting the fruits of their research and 
in their patent applications, the researchers made clear the extent to 
which they had relied on the findings of the ethnopharmaceutical 
investigation in Guiana.22 (Their transparency in this respect was 
unusual.) However, they made no provision for compensating the 
individuals they had interviewed, the indigenous groups to which those 
individuals belonged, the government of Guiana, or the government of 
France (of which Guiana is formally a part) for the benefit they had 
obtained from the study. Why not? They later offered several reasons 
for this omission: 
[I]n 2009, in French Guiana, no legal framework required researchers 
to set up a benefit-sharing contract. In the absence of legal provisions, 
setting up a benefit-sharing contract, would have necessitated an 
arbitrary choice of rights holders. This situation would have been 
source of foreseeable conflicts; especially that Quassia amara and 
associated knowledge are biological and informational resources, 
which, under French law, fall within the public domain.23 
 
 21. Geneviève Bourdy, Catherine Aubertin, Valérie Jullian, & Eric Deharo, Quassia 
“Biopiracy” Case and the Nagoya Protocol: A Researcher’s Perspective, 206 J. 
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 290, 292 (2017). 
 22. The first paragraph of the principal publication provides:  
This study of the antiplasmodial properties of a new quassinoid from Quassia amara L. 
leaves results from our ongoing work on traditional antimalarial remedies in French 
Guiana. Through a ‘knowledge, attitudes, and practices’ survey focused on malaria and 
its treatments in this French overseas department, we showed that Q. amara leaf tea 
was the most frequently used antimalarial remedy. Q. amara belongs to the 
Simaroubaceae, a family known to contain quassinoids, secondary metabolites 
characteristic of the Sapindale order, that display a wide range of biological activities, 
among them antiparasitic activity and cytotoxicity. 
N. Cachet et al., supra note 18, at 4393. Similarly, the recitation of the “Background of the 
Invention” in U.S. Patent No. 8,604,220 states, “[a]n ethnopharmacological investigation and 
biological tests had made it possible to identify preparations based on mature leaves of Quassia 
amara as advantageous for treating malaria.” U.S. Patent No. 8,604,220 (filed June 17, 2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 23. Bourdy et al., supra note 21, at 292. 
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The combination of the patent grants to IRD and the absence of 
any provision for the individuals or groups that the researchers had 
interviewed came to the attention of Thomas Burelli, a legal scholar at 
the University of Ottawa, and Fondation Daniel Mitterand France 
Libertés, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) devoted to the 
defense of human rights. In October 2015, Burelli and France Libertés 
accused IRD of “biopiraterie.”24 IRD’s conduct, they claimed, 
perpetuated colonial practices and was “both immoral and in conflict 
with intellectual property regulations.” That accusation led to 
considerable public criticism of IRD.25 Among the sharpest critics were 
Rodolphe Alexandre, President of the Regional Council of French 
Guiana, and the Organization of Indigenous Nations in Guiana. A 
statement from the latter denounced IRD’s conduct, concluding 
simply: “l’IRD a abuse  des connaissances de la population 
guyanaise . . . .”26  
The IRD leadership and researchers resented these attacks and 
initially resisted demands that they attend in some way to the interests 
of the people and groups whose knowledge originally helped shape 
their research. In the end, though, the researchers capitulated. In 
February 2016, they issued a statement indicating that IRD would work 
with “authorities” in Guiana to develop a protocol that would 
guarantee a fair division of the benefits of any commercialization of 
IRD’s patents and ensure that the people of Guiana could obtain any 
drugs that grew out of the research at an affordable price.27 As of this 
 
 24. Frances Libertés & Thomas Burelli, Des Chercheurs Français S’approprient Des Avoirs 
Guyanais Ancestraux, FONDATION DANIELLE MITTERRAND – FRANCE LIBERTÉS (Jan. 25, 
2016), https://www.france-libertes.org/fr/des-chercheurs-francais-sapproprient-des-savoirs-
guyanais-ancestraux/ [https://perma.cc/M979-VTAM].  
 25. See, e.g., Jade Lindgaard, Des Chercheurs Français Sur Le Paludisme Accusés De 
Biopiraterie, MEDIAPART (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/250116/des-
chercheurs-francais-sur-le-paludisme-accuses-de-biopiraterie [https://perma.cc/RT4V-34RP] 
(criticizing the IRD).  
 26. Erwann S, Les Populations Autochtones S’agacent de la Biopiraterie, KOTIDIEN (Jan. 29, 
2016), http://lekotidien.fr/2016/01/29/les-populations-autochtones/ [https://perma.cc/W9U4-
LNXE]. 
 27. See L’IRD va proposer aux autorités guyanaises un protocole d’accord conjoint pour le 
partage des avantages issus du brevet SkE, INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ird.fr/toute-l-actualite/actualites/communiques-et-dossiers-de-
presse/cp-2016/l-ird-va-proposer-aux-autorites-guyanaises-un-protocole-d-accord-conjoint-pour-
le-partage-des-avantages-issus-du-brevet-ske/(language)/fre-FR [https://perma.cc/QW8J-4SF4]. 
The Institute’s proposal for a joint memorandum read: 
l’IRD proposerait aux autorités guyanaises un protocole d’accord conjoint 
garantissant: 
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writing, no details concerning the promised agreement are publicly 
available.  
B. Wandjina Spirit Images 
The Mowanjum community is a group of Australian aborigines 
who live in the Kimberley region, near the town of Derby in the 
northwest corner of the continent.28 Within the community are three 
language groups: the Wororra, the Ngarinyin, and the Wunambal. 
Most members of all three groups are poor. 
The Mowanjum believe all life on earth was created by spirits who 
long ago descended from the skies and undertook journeys across the 
world. They refer to the period of creation as the “Dreamtime” and 
call the spirits the Wandjina. 
For thousands of years, the Mowanjum have been drawing 
representations of the Wandjina on the walls and ceilings of caves. The 
images vary but all have the following features:  
Their faces have eyes and nose but never a mouth. Their 
anthropomorphic forms are frontal and often imposing in scale, 
sometimes extending up to 5 metres across the walls or ceiling of 
shelters; however, very small examples also occur. Their heads are 
surrounded by a semicircular band of solid colour or radiating or 
dotted lines that give the impression that they are wearing a helmet 
or headdress. The radiating lines from the head are said to represent 
the lightning that foreshadows the wet season rains. Wandjina are 
often shown as a full body, or at least head, shoulders and torso, but 
some have only the head and shoulders represented. The body lacks 
anatomical detail and is filled with visually powerful decorative 
designs such as dotted and striped lines over solid pigment. An oval 
 
• un partage égalitaire des résultats de la recherche et de toute retombée 
économique et financière découlant de l’exploitation de ce brevet. 
• un engagement à l’information et à la sensibilisation des communautés 
d’habitants à la démarche scientifique à la base de ce projet de recherche, 
son évolution et ses enseignements. 
• un engagement commun de garantir des conditions logistiques et de prix 
permettant l’accès des populations concernées à un éventuel nouveau 
médicament antipaludique qui serait issu de ce brevet. 
Id. For examples of publicity surrounding the announcement, see Elisabeth Pain, French Institute 
Agrees to Share Patent Benefits After Biopiracy Accusations, SCIENCE (Feb. 10, 2016, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/02/french-institute-agrees-share-patent-benefits-after-
biopiracy-accusations [https://perma.cc/ZN3D-F6WZ]; French Institute Vows to Share Gains 
After Patent Flak, SCIDEVNET, http://www.scidev.net/global/cooperation/news/french-institute-
gains-after-patent-flak.html [https://perma.cc/Q765-M8Z2]. 
 28. See Mowanjum, WINUN NGARI ABORIGINAL CORP., http://winunngari.org.au/
community/mowanjum/[http://perma.cc/T5RN-5RR4]. 
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shape on the chest placed centrally beneath the shoulders is said to 
represent the ‘Wanjin’s heart, in others its breastbone, and in yet 
others, a pearl-shell pendant.’ . . . Most significantly, Wandjina are 
luminous and imposing, their dark eyes gazing out from their white 
face mesmerise, appearing to rise out from the rock surface.29 
Some examples are set forth below30: 
 
 29. Ursula Frederick & Sue O’Connor, Wandjina, Graffiti and Heritage: The Power and 
Politics of Enduring Imagery, 15 HUMANITIES RESEARCH 153, 160 (2009). 
 30. Los Wandjinas, Las Misteriosas Pinturas Rupestres de Australia, ORGONITAS 
CANARIAS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://orgonitascanarias.blogspot.com/2014/09/los-wandjinas-las-
misteriosas-pinturas.html [http://perma.cc/G852-FWZG]. 
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To the Mowanjum, these images are not merely pictures of the 
Wandjina; they embody the Wandjina. Partly as a result, the 
Mowanjum believe that elders within the group have a responsibility 
to maintain the images. Periodically (typically annually) they repaint 
the images, or at least the more important among them.31 As a result, 
layers of paint have gradually accumulated on the cave walls. In the 
process, the images have evolved.32 
Exactly how long this practice has been maintained is disputed. 
Some archaeologists suggest that it began around 3800 BC, others 
assert that the start was more recent. But there seems to be little doubt 
that the practice is at least 1500 years old, and thus substantially 
predates the arrival of the British colonists. 
Starting in the 1930s, some members of the Mowanjum began 
drawing Wandjina images on portable media—bark, shells, and so 
forth. Some of these representations were intended for use in rituals 
and thus may be understood as supplements to the cave paintings, but 
others were intended for sale to European consumers. Paintings of 
Wandjina continue to be produced in modest numbers by Mowanjum 
artists and sold through the Mowanjum Aboriginal Arts and Culture 
Center.33 
Until recently, it was rare for persons other than members of the 
Mowanjum to create representations of Wandjina. That changed in 
2006, when an anonymous graffiti artist (or artists) began making 
drawings of Wandjina on walls, bridges, and other outdoor structures 
in Perth—roughly 800 miles from the Mowanjum settlements and the 
associated cave paintings. A few examples of the graffiti are shown 
below.34 
 
 31. VALDA BLUNDELL & DONNY WOOLAGOODJA, KEEPING THE WANJINAS FRESH 
(2005). 
 32. Alan Watchman, Repainting or Periodic-Painting at Australian Aboriginal Sites: 
Evidence from Rock-Surface Crusts, in RETOUCH: MAINTENANCE AND CONSERVATION OF 
ABORIGINAL ROCK IMAGERY 26, 26–30 (Graeme K. Ward ed., 1992). 
 33. See Artists, MOWANJUM ABORIGINAL ARTS & CULTURE CTR., 
http://mowanjumarts.com/portfolio [https://perma.cc/XT4N-942T]; cf. Mowanjum Paintings, 
JAPINGA ABORIGINAL ART, https://japingkaaboriginalart.com/collections/mowanjum 
[https://perma.cc/MS8G-437N]; Wandjina Paintings, ART HOUSE BROOME, 
https://www.arthousebroome.com.au/on-line-store/Kimberley-Art/kimberley-fine-art/wandjina-
paintings [https://perma.cc/RM82-UBCA].  
 34. Stu Rapley (yelpar), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/yelpar/347482246/ 
[https://perma.cc/82JU-6HQ7]; Mark Roy (electricnerve), FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/electricnerve/406563276/ [https://perma.cc/9HXK-UHN2].  
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Most of the graffiti images, like those above, depicted Wandjina 
in much the same way that the Mowanjum do. But a few deviated from 
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the traditional form. For example, the image reprinted below combines 
a Wandjina with a black Christ figure.35 
 
 
The appearance of these images on public spaces in Perth 
triggered a secondary phenomenon, which came to be known as 
“Wandjina watching.” Residents of Perth began to take photographs 
of the graffiti images and then post them to websites, usually along with 
indications of their locations. 
Some members of the Mowanjum were untroubled by the graffiti 
and the online distribution of copies thereof. Most, however, expressed 
outrage. An example: 
As an Aboriginal, I am upset at the way my choice to greet and 
respect the Wandjina (law) has been taken from me. You aren’t 
supposed to just walk up to Wandjina and take a photo. You aren’t 
supposed to look at him unless the correct rites have been conducted. 
It’s disrespectful.36  
 
 35. AUSTL. NAT’L U., http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p14881/images/
Figure10.14.jpg [http://perma.cc/AWL3-3SL6]. 
 36. What are Wandjinas?, CREATIVE SPIRITS, https://www.creativespirits.info/
aboriginalculture/arts/what-are-wandjinas [perma.cc/SH7J-LU5D]; see also Taryne Laffar, Who 
Paintin’ Dis Wandjina? & Director Interview with Taryne Laffar, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXTuwPDsvDM. 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
2018] TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 1525 
Under increasing pressure, the anonymous graffiti artist agreed to 
stop making the drawings, and they gradually deteriorated.  
In 2010, the controversy was revived when Vesna Tenodi, a gallery 
owner in Katoomba, Australia, commissioned a sculpture featuring 
representations of Wandjina, which she then placed outdoors in public 
view at the edge of her property.37 A photograph of the sculpture 
appears below.38 
 
 
 
The objections of many Mowanjum and their supporters to the 
public display of the sculpture prompted the Blue Mountains City 
Council and Commissioner Tuor of the Land and Environment Court 
to entertain a request that it be removed.39 The testimony of Donny 
Woolagoodja at one of the hearings on the petition captures many 
dimensions of the Mowanjum’s objections: 
 
 37. For thorough discussions of the context of the sculpture, see Tim Elliott, Kimberley 
Sacred Wandjina Image Misused, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 20, 2010), 
http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/art-and-design/art-battle-turns-ugly-as-aborigines-
condemn-sculptures-sacred-image-20100319-qm1g.html [https://perma.cc/44VW-HNM3]; Law 
Report: Wading Into the Wandjina Controversy (ABC radio broadcast June 29, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/wading-into-the-wandjina-
controversy/3032658 [https://perma.cc/R7WL-Z8S7].  
 38. Reiner de Ruit, Wanjina Watchers in the Whispering Stone, ARTS L. CTR. AUSTL. (2010), 
https://www.artslaw.com.au/images/uploads/AITB1_-_Katoomba_scupture_Reinier_de_Ruit_
2010.jpg [https://perma.cc/C7UU-FQTL] (photograph of sculpture by Benedikt Osvath).  
 39. See Vanessa Mills, Stony Response to Wandjina Sculpture, ABC KIMBERLEY (Oct. 20, 
2010), http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/10/20/3043661.htm [https://perma.cc/82Q3-
MKSD]. 
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I am an elder and senior lawman of the Worrorra Aboriginal people 
of the Western Kimberley region. . . . I write this as the representative 
of the Worrorra people. I am authorised to speak on their behalf. 
The term ‘Wandjina’ or ‘Wanjina’ or ‘Ounjina’ refers to the spiritual 
creator and source of Law for the Worrorra Aboriginal people. The 
‘Wandjina’ have been artistically depicted by the Worrorra people for 
thousands of years in a uniquely distinctive form (for example as 
images on bark). The paintings of ‘Wandjina’ in ancient rock art in 
our country are there because Wandjina have ‘left’ their images at 
these sites as paintings. For us, these images are not ‘paintings’ in the 
Western sense. For us, they are living, sentient spirits. They visit us in 
our dreams; they instruct us in our dreams; and we interact with them 
when we visit their paintings at rock art sites. We reproduce these 
images in our contemporary art where they are distinguished by their 
large heads, large black eyes, and typically by halo-like rings that 
encircle their heads. 
The ‘Wandjina’ have a spiritual or religious significance to the 
Worrorra people. Images of ‘Wandjina’ are religious symbols and are 
depicted by us respectfully and in accordance with our Law. 
All Worrora people whether living in the Western Kimberley or 
elsewhere are offended and distressed by the prominent public 
display of the sculpture: 
• the sculpture is created and displayed by people who are not 
from our language or cultural group; 
• the sculpture is not a genuine or authentic Wandjina; 
• the sculpture is associated with the First Applicant whose 
book “Dreamtime: Set In Stone” argues that Aboriginal 
people are a “dying race” and suffering from “spiritual 
atrophy” and that “Aboriginal culture has all but 
disappeared.” She illustrates her book with Wandjina images 
to support an argument that “Aboriginal people are 
spiritually . . . in a no man’s land” and are “pitiful creatures”. 
The sculpture is a tangible evidence of her appropriation and 
diminution of our culture; 
• the sculpture is a caricature of the Wandjina spirit and its 
presence mocks and denigrates the spiritual beliefs of the 
Worrorra people. It exemplifies the racial and religious 
intolerance of those responsible for the sculpture and their 
contempt for our religious and spiritual beliefs; 
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• the misuse of the Wandjina imagery reflects badly on us as 
having failed to prevent it and has a negative impact on our 
relationship with the Aboriginal people of the Katoomba 
area who are embarrassed by its presence within their 
community; 
• this misuse of our imagery humiliates us in the eyes of other 
Indigenous people and younger generations of our own 
people by undermining our attempts to protect and nurture 
our culture for future generations; 
• Ms Tenodi’s depiction of the Wandjina imagery incorporates 
mouths. The Wandjina are never depicted in this way by 
Aboriginal people. This depiction is particularly offensive to 
us. The Wanjina we depict in our contemporary art are too 
powerful to be depicted with mouths—their power descends 
to Earth through the line seen as a nose; and 
• Ms Tenodi is using Wandjina imagery for commercial 
purposes and is thereby abusing our indigenous culture.40 
Tenodi’s responses to these arguments are best expressed in an 
interview she provided midway through the litigation process: 
There is no copyright on prehistoric imagery, and no-one can prohibit 
any artist to explore the design, or to express themselves or to be 
influenced or inspired, and this happens all the time. And I can 
recognise in contemporary art or sculpture, the work, I can recognise 
exactly the prehistoric figurine that they’re inspired by, it’s so 
obvious, and I would never hold it against them that they draw 
inspiration from Egyptian tradition, or Greek mythology, or Roman 
gods. I mean like cave paintings in Europe, Altamira or Lascaux, or 
the beautiful cave art that belongs to let’s say the same time as 
Australian art. They are listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List, 
and that makes sense in my mind, because it does belong to the world, 
and to claim ownership, any individual or group or nation to claim 
ownership of those is simply ludicrous.41 
 
 40. Protecting the Sacred Wandjina: The Land and Environment Court Goes to the Blue 
Mountains, ARTS L. CTR. AUSTL. (June 22, 2011), https://www.artslaw.com.au/art-
law/entry/protecting-the-sacred-wandjina-the-land-and-environment-court-goes-to-the-b 
[https://perma.cc/FCJ5-N8RX]. 
 41. Wading into the Wandjina Controversy, ABC RADIO NETWORK (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/wading-into-the-wandjina-
controversy/3032658#transcript [http://perma.cc/3AZ6-XV89]. In a later interview, Ms. Tenodi 
elaborated on these arguments. An audio recording of the later interview is available at Vanessa 
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The City Council was unpersuaded by these analogies, granted the 
request that the sculpture be removed, and ultimately rejected 
Tenodi’s appeal.42 In November 2011, the sculpture was taken away.43 
C. Tibetan Rugs 
In the nineteenth century, weavers in central Tibet developed a 
distinctive style of carpet.44 Many of these carpets were meant to be 
used for prayer and other spiritual purposes (such as wrapping the 
pillars of temples), while others were used in secular contexts, such as 
padding saddles or as seating mats indoors. The patterns of the rugs 
typically alluded in some way to the lives of the Buddha or of Buddhist 
monks. In developing them, the weavers were influenced by aesthetic 
traditions in East Turkestan, Central Asia, China, and India. The 
material most often employed to weave the rugs was a distinctive wool, 
known as Changpel, taken from Tibetan highland sheep. Changpel is 
unusually thick, strong, and high in lanolin—and thus has a distinctive 
texture. The most unusual aspect of these carpets was the method by 
which they were woven, which dramatically affected their appearance. 
Tom O’Neill explains: 
Tibetan hand-knotted carpets are woven on vertical looms that have 
expandable beams to control the tension of the warp, around which it 
was continuously wound. This preliminary process, known as 
‘dressing’ the loom, was performed prior to weaving, with the loom 
laid on the floor, the threads of the warp being straightened after it 
had been set back up. The warp was traditionally made from hand-
spun wool . . . and the texture of this wool warp was in older Tibetan 
carpets extremely variable, making it: 
. . . individualistic to the extreme: the unique method of 
mounting the loom and tensioning the warp led to more 
 
Mills, Stony Response to Wandjina Sculpture, ABC: KIMBERLEY (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/10/20/3043661.htm [http://perma.cc/TRL7-YVT6]. 
 42. Tenodi v Blue Mountains City Council [2011] NSWLEC 1183 (Austl.). 
 43. Katoomba Kataclysm, or Hands Off Our Wandjina!, IPKAT (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2012/01/katoomba-kataclysm-or-hands-off-our.html [http://perma.
cc/D8WP-DDWP]. 
 44. Exactly when this aesthetic tradition began is not altogether clear. For views on the 
subject, see JOHN PAGE & SERINA PAGE, THE WOVEN MYSTERY: OLD TIBETAN RUGS 2 (2d ed. 
1994) (“That the tradition is old, perhaps a thousand years, few today dispute, but how old is a 
matter of speculation.”); id. at 8 (“I have seen no rug made in the so-called Tibetan technique . . . 
which I personally would date with much confidence to before the mid 19th century.”).  
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irregularities that were peculiar to each weaver’s 
tension. . . . 
Most early Tibetan carpets were small, and woven by a single person. 
An end binding is formed by throwing four or five wefts before the 
actual knotting of the pile begins. Then a process of knotting began 
which was, and is today, a technique that remains exclusive to Tibetan 
carpet weaving.  
  Generally, the piles of other Oriental hand-knotted carpets are 
formed by wool threads looped around the warp and weft one at a 
time and then cut to length. The pile of Tibetan carpets is formed 
instead around a metal gauge rod which is tied to the warp, and the 
wool is looped continuously around both the warp and the gauge rod 
until there is a colour change, when the wool is cut and the new colour 
tied in. When the gauge rod has been completely covered by a row of 
loops, it is driven down to the previously knotted rows and then a flat 
knife is slid across the face of the cylindrical rod, cutting the loops to 
form the pile. This technique of ‘cutting loops’ was thought by 
Denwood and other historians of the Tibetan carpets to be an archaic 
method which adapted South-East to Central Asian styles of weaving, 
and was not found anywhere but in Tibet . . . .45 
Most of these carpets were woven in individual households, typically 
by women.46 By the late nineteenth century, some of the weaving seems 
to have been done in larger workplaces, which were financially 
supported by feudal landlords.47 A few examples of this art form are 
shown below.48 
 
 
 45. Tom O’Neill, The Lives of the Tibeto-Nepalese Carpet, 4 J. MATERIAL CULTURE 21, 27–
28 (1999) (quoting Thomas Guta, The Tibetan Carpet, by Philip Denwood, 6 KAILASH 285, 287 
(1978)); see also PACIFIC ASIA MUSEUM, WOVEN JEWELS: TIBETAN RUGS FROM SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIAN COLLECTIONS 11 (1992).  
 46. See Ugen Gombo, Tibetan Refugees in the Kathmandu Valley: Adaptation of a 
Population in Exile 96 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at 
Stony Brook).  
 47. See PAGE & PAGE, supra note 44, at 2. 
 48. PACIFIC ASIA MUSEUM, supra note 45, at 35, 53; PAGE & PAGE, supra note 44, at 56–57.  
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“Pillar-style Sleeping Rug” 
3’0” x 6’4” 
19th/20th century 
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“Horse Blanket” 
6’0” x 3’8” 
19th/20th century 
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“A naturalistic tiger skin on a natural ground” 
4’11” x 3’1” 
pile, warp, and weft: wool 
Knots: 48 per square inch 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
2018] TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 1533 
In the nineteenth century, the British Empire in India facilitated 
for the first time sales of Tibetan rugs to European consumers. 
However, the number of carpets that found their way out of Tibet was 
small. In 1959, the occupation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of 
China prompted the Dalai Lama and approximately 100,000 other 
Tibetans to flee their country. Among the group were many of the 
Tibetan weavers. Most settled in Nepal, although a minority settled in 
the provinces of Dharamsala, Ladakh, or Sikkim in India.  
At the time, Nepal was desperately poor, and most of the Tibetan 
refugees were also impoverished. In 1961, leaders of the Swiss Aid and 
Technical Assistance (SATA) organization, one of the various 
agencies trying to help the refugees, decided that an export market for 
Tibetan rugs might be cultivated, and that exploiting that market could 
provide the refugees a long-term source of income. Accordingly, 
SATA funded the creation of weaving workshops in Nepal, hired some 
of the Tibetan master weavers to create the carpets and provide 
training to others, and educated European consumers concerning the 
merits of these carpets. The success of the plan prompted other 
organizations, such as the World Bank, to lend it their assistance as 
well. Tibetan and Nepalese entrepreneurs then gradually took their 
place.49 
Between 1961 and the 1990s, exports of Tibetan carpets from 
Nepal to Europe rose steadily, except for a brief lull in 1984. In the 
process, the design of the carpets evolved to match the changing tastes 
of European (especially German) consumers. Religious themes were 
used less often, abstract patterns more often. Traditional Tibetan 
carpets are small; the exported carpets became larger, facilitating their 
use as floor coverings. The intricate central areas of the traditional 
carpets were sometimes replaced with so-called “open fields,” 
containing a single color. Tibetan wool was sometimes blended with 
wool from New Zealand. And increased quality control made the rugs 
more homogenous. 
From an economic standpoint, the net result of the process 
initiated by SATA was a remarkable success; by the end of the 
twentieth century, the export of Tibetan carpets had become the 
largest source of revenue in Nepal, enabling large numbers of Tibetan 
 
 49. See O’Neill, supra note 45, at 26–27. 
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weavers to escape poverty.50 From a cultural standpoint, the fruits were 
more mixed. Many observers lamented the atrophy of some aspects of 
the traditional rugs.51 To be sure, most carpets sold in Europe and the 
United States as “Tibetan” continued to be made in Nepal, using the 
traditional Tibetan methods, either by Tibetans or by Nepalese 
weavers. But most of the rugs differed sharply in appearance from 
those that had been common in Tibet before the Chinese Revolution.52 
In the twenty-first century, some of these aesthetic trends were 
reversed. A growing group of consumers, particularly in the United 
States, expressed interest in more “authentic” Tibetan carpets, and a 
subset of high-end American and European importers began to 
provide them. These carpets featured the traditional Buddhist images 
and themes—for example, “the dragon, snow lion, lotus flower, the 
Buddhist knot or the phoenix”53—and eschewed weaving techniques 
that foster homogenization. The result is that, today, a significant 
subset of the flow of exports looks more like the original Tibetan 
rugs—and typically sell at a premium. An example appears below54: 
 
 50. Barbara Crossette, Tibetan Carpets of Nepal, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/04/travel/tibetan-carpets-of-nepal.html?pagewanted=all 
[https://perma.cc/7Y7L-NZSA]. 
 51. See, e.g., Oriental Rugs and Rug Weaving in Nepal and Tibet, JACOBSEN RUGS (Jul. 13, 
2015), https://jacobsenrugs.com/blog/oriental-rugs-and-rug-weaving-in-nepal-and-tibet 
[https://perma.cc/4DVU-7DBA] (deploring the “machine-made” quality of Nepalese rugs).  
 52. See PACIFIC ASIA MUSEUM, supra note 45, at 9 (“The craft survives, but the post-1959 
product is a much less imaginative and more commercial-looking shadow of its wonderful 
predecessors.”). 
 53. Tibetan Carpets from Nepal, ARTELINO (Nov. 3, 2010, 01:02 AM) 
http://www.artelino.eu/en/articles/tibetan-rugs/61-tibetan-carpets-nepal.html [https://perma.cc/
Y5WW-68D5]. 
 54. Dragons and Clouds, ARTELINO, http://www.artelino.eu/en/traditional-tibetan-
rugs.html?page=shop.product_details&flypage=flypage.tpl&product_id=132&category_id=6 
[https://perma.cc/P5HK-6DH4].  
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The degree to which the aesthetic shift has benefitted the Tibetan 
refugees (and their descendants) varies. Some of the newer rugs are 
designed by American or European artists and are merely 
manufactured in Nepal. The importers most concerned with 
authenticity, however, typically employ business practices intended to 
benefit Tibetans more directly and substantially. They are more likely 
to rely on Tibetan designers, and the terms on which their workers are 
employed in Nepal are fairer than average. Last but not least, these 
importers typically contribute a portion of their profits to educational 
or cultural institutions that benefit Tibetans. The stores and websites 
of these importers trumpet these practices. Set forth below, for 
example, is the pertinent portion of the website of Doris Leslie Blau: 
In the factory selected by the Doris Leslie Blau gallery, over half the 
employees are Tibetan. The original Tibetan Master Weavers, who 
came from Tibet, have trained the current master weavers. The 
workers in all hand manufacturing processes: carding, spinning, dying, 
weaving, shearing, carving, etc., have learned from Tibetan masters. 
Many factory employees have 30 years of experience . . . . 
This factory provides living quarters, clean drinking water, childcare 
and health benefits to its employees. No manufacturing processes use 
child labor and the company takes steps to improve its local 
environment . . . . 
The company has superior abilities and has a proven track record. 
Management philosophies and practices, including those regarding 
social and ecological responsibilities, are exemplary in Nepal. Doris 
Leslie Blau aims to produce the best quality of rugs available in 
Nepal, with a factory that maintains high standards for their work, 
employees and their families, and local environment.55 
 
 55. Tibetan Rugs, Doris Leslie Blau, https://www.dorisleslieblau.com/articles/tibetan-rugs-
at-doris-leslie-blau [https://perma.cc/5QED-VLZM]. Another importer’s marketing materials 
say: 
My Nepalese friend has traveled to Western countries for attending fairs and visiting 
his international customers for decades. Germany is the country that he knows best, 
and where he experienced among others German social structures and working 
conditions. 
This made him establish a children nursery and later a school for the children of the 
workers. These exist now for decades and are for Nepal exemplary and unique. 
Currently the carpet manufactory employs three teachers. The costs for the children 
nursery and the school have to be covered by the income from the carpet sales - 
something not always easy. Large Western importing companies push for the lowest 
per square meter prices and could care less about working conditions. 
The artelino carpet commissions will support these social activities by paying a fair 
price. A few dollars can have a big effect in Nepal. 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1536  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
Adherence to these principles seems to contribute to the 
importers’ ability to charge atypically high prices for their carpets.56 A 
portion of that premium redounds to the benefit of Tibetans. 
II.  THE LAW 
Currently, every country in the world establishes and enforces its 
own rules concerning permissible uses of traditional knowledge. The 
approaches they have taken vary widely, but most of the national 
regimes fall into one of four categories. Countries in the first group 
expressly repudiate legal protection for traditional knowledge. For 
example, the Copyright Act of Lithuania provides: “Copyright shall 
not apply to . . . works of folk art.”57 
In the second group of countries, courts have construed existing 
intellectual property laws to establish some limitations on uses of 
traditional knowledge. In perhaps the most famous example, 
Australian courts ruled that the importation and sale of carpets bearing 
images derived from motifs developed by aboriginal groups violated 
Australian copyright law.58  
In the third group, legislators have modified existing intellectual 
property statutes to reach traditional knowledge. For example, in New 
Zealand, the trademark statute was amended to forbid the registration 
of trademarks based on Māori text or imagery where the use or 
registration of such marks would be offensive to the Māori.59 In 
 
Needless to say that there is no children labor used in the carpet manufactory of my 
Nepalese friend. 
I want to encourage you to purchase one of these traditional Tibetan carpets. Not for 
charity reasons (I believe only in projects that are viable for commercial reasons!). But 
for your own advantage. This is a great, beautiful product that you will not find so easily 
anywhere else. If you consider that one person works roughly for three months on a 
carpet of ca. 90 by 180 cm = 3 by 6 feet, the price is definitely more than reasonable. If 
Nepal should ever make an economic upswing as can be watched currently in China, 
such prices will be a thing of the past one day anyway. Honestly, I hope it for the people 
of Nepal. This country holds the position of 13th poorest state in the world. 
Tibetan Carpets from Nepal, supra note 53. 
 56. For example, “Dragons and Clouds,” the carpet shown in the text following note 54, 
though modest in size (95 cm x 195 cm) is offered for sale at €480. Many of the rugs offered by 
Doris Leslie Blau cost more than $10,000; at least one is listed for $50,000. See DORIS LESLIE 
BLAU, https://www.dorisleslieblau.com/tibetan-rugs?category_id=100&page=2 [http://perma.cc/
5S96-FDDL]. 
 57. Law on Copyright and Related Rights of 2000, ch. II, § 1, art. 5 (Lith.). 
 58. Milpurrurru et al. v Indofurn Pty Ltd [1994] 54 FCR 240 (Austl.), 
https://jade.io/article/195477 [https://perma.cc/6MRQ-VM9M]. 
 59. Māori IP, N.Z. Intell. Prop. Off., https://www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/maori-ip/ 
[https://perma.cc/LBC8-CTBB]. 
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Cameroon, Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda, “folklore” is now by 
statute expressly included in the ambit of copyright law—and in some 
of those countries is given extensive protection.60 Several countries 
have also amended their patent statutes to require applicants who 
relied on traditional knowledge when developing their inventions to 
disclose such reliance.61 
In the fourth group of countries, lawmakers have created sui 
generis regimes governing traditional knowledge. Examples include 
 
 60. See, e.g., Law No. 2000/011 of December 19, 2000 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
Law, § 5 (Cameroon), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cm/cm001en.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/A8PV-2FKD]; Order No. 13 of 1989, Copyright Order, §§ 18–23 (Lesotho), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ls/ls003en.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LVS-FTLG]; Loi no. 
08-024 du 23 juillet 2008, Fixant le Régime de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique en République 
du Mali, ch. 3, art. 110 (Mali), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/ml/ml015fr.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3UJQ-M7LC]. Senegal’s regime is one of the most generous in scope: 
Part four—Folklore and the domaine public payant  
Article 156. Definition of folklore.—“Folklore” means all literary and artistic 
productions created by authors deemed to be of Senegalese nationality that are passed 
from generation to generation and constitute one of the basic elements of the 
traditional cultural heritage of Senegal.  
Article 157. Exploitation of folklore and works in the public domain.—1. The 
exploitation of folklore or of works derived from folklore, and of works that have fallen 
into the public domain on expiry of the periods provided for in Articles 51 to 55, shall 
be declared to the collective management society approved for that purpose and shall 
be subject to payment of a royalty.  
2. The amount of the royalty shall be determined by the Minister of Culture. It may not 
exceed 50 per cent of the rate of remuneration usually paid to authors in accordance 
with current contracts or practices.  
Article 158. Allocation of royalties.—1. The royalties provided for in the previous 
paragraph shall be distributed as follows:  
(a) collection without arrangement or personal input: 50 per cent to the person who 
carried out the collection, 50 per cent to the approved collective management society;  
(b) collection with arrangement or adaptation: 75 per cent to the author, 25 per cent to 
the approved collective management society.  
2. Sums paid to the collective management society shall be used for social and cultural 
purposes.  
Article 159. Proceedings.—In the event of illegal exploitation of folklore or of works 
that have fallen into the public domain, the State Judicial Officer, at the request of the 
Minister of Culture, shall have the capacity to take legal action. The infringement 
seizure proceedings provided for in Articles 131 et seq. of the present Law shall apply.  
Article 160. Penalties.—The illegal exploitation of folklore or of works that have fallen 
into the public domain shall be punishable by a fine equal to 500,000 CFA francs, 
without prejudice to the damages that may be allocated to the civil claimant. 
Law 2008-09 of January 25, 2008 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights in Senegal, pt. 4, art. 156–
60 (Senegal), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sn/sn004en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GWA5-EHCX]. 
 61. For catalogues of such provisions, see DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, WIPO, BRIDGING THE 
GAP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES IN WIPO’S 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE (IGC) 31–32 (2012); WIPO, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
TABLE (Oct. 2017), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/
genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N6A-Y3GN]. 
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the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of the Philippines and Guatemala’s 
Cultural Heritage Protection Act.62 
For the most part, these rules only apply within the countries 
setting them. The net result is that, globally, the treatment of 
traditional knowledge varies radically by jurisdiction, and the 
governments of nations from which traditional knowledge is taken 
have little or no power to control uses of that knowledge in other 
nations. In this respect, the law governing traditional knowledge today 
resembles the law governing patents and copyrights in the mid-
nineteenth century, when each country set the rules applicable in its 
own territory—and, in shaping those rules, typically favored its own 
citizens and incorporated locally dominant ideologies.  
During the past forty years, advocates of enhanced legal 
protection for traditional knowledge have frequently sought through 
regional or multilateral agreements to strengthen and harmonize the 
rights of indigenous groups and to expand the geographic reach of 
those rights.63 Some of those efforts have borne fruit. The principal 
examples are listed in the following chart.  
  
 
 62. Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural 
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, 
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, 
Rep. Act 8371 (Oct. 29, 1997) (Phil.); Decreto Numero 26-97 y sus reformas, Ley para la 
Protección del Patrimonio Cultural de la Nación (Guat.) http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=235791 [https://perma.cc/KD9N-JK2Q]; Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 
1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305 (2012). 
 63. In some respects, these initiatives echo the late-nineteenth century efforts to harmonize 
(partially) the laws governing copyrights and patents—efforts that generated the Berne 
Convention and the Paris Convention. 
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Table 1: Regional and Multilateral Agreements 
 
 64. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as 
amended Sept. 28, 1979, WIPO Lex No. TRT/BERNE/001, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=12214 [https://perma.cc/BQP7-N2V5]. 
 65. UNESCO & WIPO, TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (1976), ftp://ftp.wipo.int/pub/library/ebooks/historical-ipbooks/
TunisModelLawOnCopyright/TunisModelLawOnCopyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW3S-
5RWB].  
 66. Bangui Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property 
Organization, Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African 
and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property art. 46, Mar. 2, 1977, WIPO Lex No. TRT/OA002/003 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details.jsp?treaty_id=227 [https://perma.cc/
XG3H-MEPM]; Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the Creation 
of an African Intellectual Property Organization, Feb. 24, 1999, WIPO Lex No. TRT/OA002/002, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?doc_id=13288 2&file_id=181151 
[https://perma.cc/ZE97-YF4L].  
 67. UNESCO & WIPO, MODEL PROVISIONS FOR NATIONAL LAWS ON THE PROTECTION 
OF EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE AGAINST ILLICIT EXPLOITATION AND OTHER PREJUDICIAL 
ACTIONS (1982), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/unesco/unesco001en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KTT5-KUJA]. 
 68. UNESCO 31 C/Res. 25, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, annex 
I, art. 9 (Nov. 2, 2001), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001246/124687e.pdf#page=67 
[https://perma.cc/X5SA-LRNG].  
 69. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Docs. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 
13, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W2EC-KATN].  
Date 
adopted 
Organization Agreement 
1967 Berne Convention, Stockholm 
Conference 
Berne Convention section 
15(4)64 
1976 WIPO, UNESCO, Tunisia 
Tunis Model Law on 
Copyright for Developing 
Countries65 
1977; 1999 
Organisation Africaine de la 
Propriété Intellectuelle  Bangui Agreement
66 
1982 WIPO and UNESCO 
Model Provisions for the 
Protection of Expressions 
of Folklore67 
2001 UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity68 
2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples69 
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Most of these agreements fell short of the aspirations of their sponsors. 
Some of them were signed, ratified, or implemented by too few 
countries. Others failed to specify adequately the kinds of knowledge 
to which they applied. Others did not clearly identify the groups or 
public authorities to which the rights they created would attach or how 
to determine which rights would be assigned to which entities. Finally, 
many lacked sufficient teeth to ensure compliance by signatory 
countries.72 
However, the most recent of the agreements—the Nagoya 
Protocol—is neither vague nor toothless and thus merits further 
attention. The primary objective of the Protocol is to promote “the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of 
genetic resources”73—an important goal but one that lies outside the 
zone of issues addressed in this Essay. The secondary objective of the 
Protocol is more germane; it seeks to ensure equitable sharing of the 
benefits of “genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local 
communities” and “traditional knowledge associated with” those 
resources.74 In brief, the latter dimension of the Protocol works as 
 
 70. Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of 
Folklore, Aug. 9, 2010, WIPO Lex No. TRT/AP010/001, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/other_treaties/text.jsp?doc_id=1 50520&file_id=201022 [https://perma.cc/H6LK-J65L]. 
 71. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, Oct. 29, 
2010, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; see also The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing, 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/ [https://perma.cc/764V-
34SZ] (explaining the Nagoya Protocol). 
 72. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 1227–32. 
 73. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 71, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. art. 5, 7. As David Smith and his colleagues explain: 
In order to achieve this, Parties will provide on the ABS Clearing House 
(https://absch.cbd.int/) records of the relevant legislation or other regulatory 
requirements, including where access provisions apply, and they will designate an ABS 
National Focal Point (NFP) to provide information and a Competent National 
Authority (CNA) to provide PIC and the necessary permits. When a permit or 
equivalent is issued, the CNA will publish this (without confidential content) as an 
2010 African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organization  
Swakopmund Protocol on 
the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge 
and Expressions of 
Folklore70  
2010 Convention on Biological Diversity 
Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-
Sharing71 
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follows: a member country must adopt national legislation to ensure 
that such resources and knowledge located within its own territory are 
accessed only “with the prior and informed consent and approval and 
involvement of these indigenous and local communities, and that 
mutually agreed terms have been established.”75 All other countries 
adhering to the Protocol are obliged to adopt national legislation—
reinforced by appropriate penalties—ensuring that such resources and 
knowledge are “utilized” within their own jurisdictions only if the 
“domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory 
requirements” adopted by the source country have been properly 
observed.76  
To illustrate: Namibia, a signatory to the Protocol, recently 
adopted legislation that, once fully implemented, will require 
companies seeking access to genetic resources and accompanying 
traditional knowledge in Namibia to obtain prior informed consent of 
the groups holding such knowledge.77 The European Union has ratified 
the Protocol and has adopted regulations fulfilling its responsibility to 
enforce access restrictions in other ratifying countries.78 In addition, 
some of the members of the European Union (such as Germany) have 
also ratified the Protocol and adopted domestic implementing 
regulations.79 The net effect is that a company that engages in 
bioprospecting in Namibia without the permission of the relevant 
 
Internationally Recognized Certificate of Compliance (IRCC) on the ABS Clearing 
House. Parties will also monitor utilization within their jurisdiction by designating 
checkpoints to determine whether genetic resources being utilized have been accessed 
in accordance with PIC and whether MAT have been established, and they will place 
reports of utilization on the ABS Clearing House as Checkpoint Communiques. 
David Smith, Manuela da Silva, Julian Jackson, & Christopher Lyal, Explanation of the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing and its Implication for Microbiology, 163 MICROBIOLOGY 
289, 290 (2017). 
 75. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 71, art. 7. 
 76. Id. art. 16. For a helpful summary of the mechanics of this system, see JEROME S. 
REICHMAN, WHY THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL TO THE CBD MATTERS TO SCIENCE 
AND INDUSTRY IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 7–8 (2018), 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.158web.pdf [http://perma.
cc/WMS8-SQ7W]. 
 77. See Absalom Shigwedha, Namibia Passes Bill On Use of Genetic Resources, NAMIBIAN 
(May 11, 2017), http://allafrica.com/stories/201705110836.html [https://perma.cc/APV5-YXBN].  
 78. See Regulation 511/2014 of Apr. 16, 2014, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 150) 57, 59 (EU); 
Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1866 of Oct. 13, 2015, art. 1, 2015 O.J. (L 275) 58, 4 
(EU).  
 79. See Bruce S. Manheim, Jr., Freedom to Utilize Genetic Resources? The Nagoya Protocol 
Two Years Later, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2016/10/24/freedom-utilize-genetic-resources-nagoya-protocol-two-years-later/ 
[http://perma.cc/XV3Y-MH4A]. 
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indigenous group would be subject to serious sanctions in Germany (up 
to 50,000 Euros for each offense) if it sought to commercialize there a 
compound derived from that bioprospecting. 
The coverage of the Protocol is as yet uneven. Even in the 
signatory countries, it is far from fully operational. As of this writing, 
104 nations have ratified the Protocol,80 but only a subset of them have 
adopted local legislation either restricting access to genetic resources 
and accompanying knowledge or punishing “utilization” in their own 
jurisdictions of resources and knowledge acquired in violation of access 
restrictions in the country from which they were taken.81 The United 
States has not joined either the Convention on Biological Diversity or 
the Protocol—and it is not likely to do so in the near future.82 
That, in brief, is the current state of the law governing traditional 
knowledge. In the opinions of many observers and members of 
indigenous groups, the protections that these regimes, in combination, 
provide to indigenous groups are inadequate. The questions addressed 
in the remainder of this Essay are whether those protections should be 
enlarged and, if so, how. 
III.  THE PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
In the absence of an affirmative justification for extending 
enhanced legal protection to traditional knowledge, we ought not to do 
it. The free flow of ideas and information has myriad economic and 
cultural benefits; we should not sacrifice those benefits without a good 
reason. 
During the extended debate over the appropriate legal status of 
traditional knowledge, many arguments have been advanced for 
overriding the presumption against enhanced protection. Most of the 
colorable arguments are grounded in one of three normative 
 
 80. See Parties to the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/default.shtml [https://perma.cc/XK3U-
8G8S]. 
 81. For current information concerning the status of the implementation initiatives, see The 
Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House (ABSCH), CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, https://absch.cbd.int [https://perma.cc/6TWD-Y4RE].  
 82. Nevertheless, many academic and research organizations in the United States have 
undertaken efforts to comply with the regulations adopted by the member countries of the 
Protocol. See Kevin McCluskey et al., The U.S. Culture Collection Network Responding to the 
Requirements of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing, MBIO, July/Aug. 2017, at 1 
(2017), http://mbio.asm.org/content/8/4/e00982-17.full [http://perma.cc/SD49-YTUH]. 
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frameworks: labor-desert theory, considerations of corrective justice, 
or utilitarianism. These three clusters of arguments are summarized 
and evaluated below. The primary claim of this analysis is that in all 
three theoretical sectors, the arguments for legal reform prove weak. 
However, there remains a fourth, less familiar normative framework 
under whose auspices some less conventional arguments for 
strengthened protection for traditional knowledge might be advanced. 
That perspective receives more extended treatment in Part IV. 
A. Labor 
In some countries, including the United States, it is customary to 
justify intellectual property rights at least partly on the ground that 
they constitute fair rewards for hard work. The philosophic root of this 
perspective is John Locke’s famous contention that, in a state of nature, 
labor expended in cultivating a tract of land previously “held in 
common” gives the laborer a natural property right in the tract (subject 
to certain provisos)—a right that the state, when it comes into being, 
has an obligation to respect and enforce. Many judges and scholars 
have taken the position that the same moral principle justifies granting 
to authors and inventors analogous protection (for limited times) for 
their respective writings and inventions—subject to some important 
limitations also grounded in Locke’s argument.83 
Some advocates of according indigenous groups greater legal 
rights to their traditional knowledge have sought support from this 
Lockean argument. They point out that it requires hard work to 
develop a plant-based remedy for malaria or a novel technique for 
weaving carpets. If we are willing to give the writer of a novel or the 
inventor of a better mousetrap exclusive rights to specified uses of their 
creations, why should we not accord similar entitlements to the groups 
whose members developed the plant-based remedy or weaving 
technique?84 
 
 83. For manifestations of this approach, see William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, 
in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170–71 (Stephen R. 
Munzer ed., 2001).  
 84. See, e.g., Joseph M. Wekundah, Why Protect Traditional Knowledge, 44 AFR. TECH. 
POL’Y STUD. NETWORK BIOTECHNOLOGY TR. AFR. 1, 11 (2012) (arguing that, because inventors 
own their inventions, indigenous groups should own their traditional knowledge as well); cf. 
Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1179–82 (2008) (exploring possible bases of intellectual property rights 
in collective labor). 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1544  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
Putting aside the difficulties of using Locke’s vision to justify 
ordinary intellectual property rights,85 extending that argument to 
traditional knowledge is fraught with more severe analytical problems. 
These have been persuasively catalogued by Steven Munzer, Kai 
Raustiala, and Justin Hughes.86 I will limit myself to a summary of their 
persuasive critique. 
The first problem is that most of the labor in producing traditional 
knowledge typically was expended long ago by ancestors of the current 
members of the group, who are now seeking enhanced legal protection. 
It is far from clear that the natural rights of the original workers, 
whatever they may be, run to their descendants. 
That gap might be bridged by highlighting work done by members 
of the present generation in extending and modifying the traditional 
knowledge—gradually altering the Wandjina cave images while 
repainting them, adjusting the traditional Buddhist carpet designs, and 
so forth. But many forms of traditional knowledge, particularly those 
that involve socially beneficial uses of natural resources, do not seem 
to evolve in this fashion. For example, there is little evidence that 
current members of the Galibi or Palikur groups have altered the 
formulations of the antimalarial tea made from Quassia amara.  
Moreover, the labor involved in adjusting and sustaining a body of 
knowledge seems substantially more modest—and thus less deserving 
of reward—than its original development. Our treatment of analogous 
situations that implicate standard forms of intellectual property 
confirms this intuition: we sometimes grant copyright protection to the 
creator of a derivative work or patent protection to the person who 
improves an invention, but such protection only extends to the 
modification. We do not give the improver any rights over the original 
invention. 
A more fundamental difficulty associated with relying on labor to 
justify legal protection for traditional knowledge is that, typically, the 
efforts of the original developers of the knowledge were undertaken 
for reasons unrelated to control over the knowledge—and 
achievement of those goals seems a morally sufficient reward. The 
original developers of the Quassia amara tea were trying to cure the 
members of their community of malaria—and they seem to have 
succeeded. The members of the Mowanjum groups of indigenous 
Australians painted the original versions of the Wandjina to honor and 
 
 85. Those difficulties are discussed in Fisher, supra note 83, at 184–89. 
 86. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 1246–51; Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 1, at 37, 63–65. 
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sustain their spirit ancestors—and they too seem to have accomplished 
that end. An additional secular reward for their effort could fairly be 
characterized as a windfall. 
Finally, important practical problems attend reliance on labor-
desert theory in this context. For example, as Robert Nozick has 
pointed out, it is both important and difficult to formulate a property 
right that will give a laborer a reward proportional to his or her effort.87 
Achieving that goal in the context of traditional knowledge would be 
especially difficult, when the magnitude of the effort must be inferred 
from its contemporary residue and where the entitlement sought—a 
perpetual exclusive right—is so expansive. 
In combination, these problems prevent labor-desert theory from 
offering a convincing justification for the presumption against legal 
protection. 
B. Corrective Justice 
The second line of argument contends that according indigenous 
groups enhanced protection for their traditional knowledge is 
necessary to compensate them (at least partially) for the injustice with 
which those groups have been treated during the period of colonial 
conquest and exploitation. One strong statement of this argument 
(along with some others, to which we will turn below) can be found in 
the following passage from “Indigenous Knowledge, Anti-Colonialism 
and Empowerment” by Waziyatawin: 
Indigenous knowledge recovery is an anti-colonial project. It is a 
project that gains its momentum from the anguish of loss of what was 
and the determined hope for what will be. It springs from the disaster 
resulting from the centuries of colonialism’s efforts to methodically 
eradicate our ways of seeing, being and interacting with the world. At 
the dawn of the 21st century, the recovery of Indigenous knowledge is 
a conscious and systematic effort to revalue that which has been 
denigrated and revive that which has been destroyed. It is about 
regaining the ways of being which allowed our peoples to live a 
spiritually-balanced, sustainable existence within our ancient 
homelands for thousands of years.88 
 
 87. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–75 (1974). 
 88. Waziyatawin, Indigenous Knowledge, Anti-colonialism and Empowerment, FED’N FOR 
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.ideas-idees.ca/blog/indigenous-knowledge-anti-
colonialism-and-empowerment [https://perma.cc/K4TQ-9XMY].  
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The contention that the legal system should compel the recipients 
of ill-gotten gains to compensate the persons from whom they were 
taken finds expression in a wide variety of contexts. It underlies, for 
example, the common law cause of action for unjust enrichment, the 
duty to rescue a person whose peril one had caused, and the obligation 
recognized by many countries to repatriate works of art wrongly taken 
from another jurisdiction. A duty to respect the traditional knowledge 
of an abused indigenous group, it can be argued, fits comfortably within 
this family of doctrines.89 
The force of this argument is strongest when enhanced legal 
protection would, in practice, curb the power of—or extract wealth 
from—the group most responsible for the exploitation of the 
indigenous group in question. Perhaps the clearest illustration is the 
assertion of legal rights by indigenous Australians against the 
descendants of the British colonists—as, for example, in the claims 
made by the Mowanjum and their legal representatives against 
unauthorized use by Caucasian Australians of the Wandjina images. In 
a 2010 interview, Jenny Wright, the manager of the Mowanjum Arts 
and Cultural Centre in Derby, expressed eloquently the senses of guilt 
and responsibility that helped fuel the removal from public property of 
Vesna Tenodi’s sculpture: 
I think one part of me would say, Vesna we’ve taken everything from 
these people, we’ve taken their land, we’ve taken their language, 
we’ve destroyed their culture. Are we going to take their religion too? 
It just seems to me, and I know I’m making a very strong statement 
here, but I do feel this in my heart, that it just seems to me that that’s 
so grossly unfair, and as an Australian I think you should feel 
ashamed of yourself, seriously. Appropriation of absolutely 
everything. Is there nothing left of these people that we won’t take?90 
However, in most controversies over permissible uses of 
traditional knowledge, the impact of enhanced legal protection will not 
be so clearly concentrated on a group strongly associated with 
oppression of the indigenous group in question. For example, the 
agreement by IRD to provide the members of the Galibi and Palikur a 
share of the proceeds from any antimalarial drug derived from 
 
 89. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 1220. 
 90. Interview by Damien Carrick with Jenny Wright, Manager of the Mowanjum Arts and 
Cultural Centre in Derby, Wash. (Jun. 29, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/
programs/lawreport/wading-into-the-wandjina-controversy/3032658 [https://perma.cc/DJQ9-
8M7H]. 
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Simalikalactone E will ultimately increase the prices paid for that drug 
by malaria victims throughout the world, many of whom have no 
connection to the genocide and exploitation practiced by the 
Portuguese (and, to a lesser extent) the French in Latin America. 
Indeed, even in the Australian context, the argument sometimes slips. 
Vesna Tenodi, it turns out, is a Croatian immigrant to Australia; it is 
thus difficult to assign her responsibility for the mistreatment of the 
Aborigines.  
This difficulty could perhaps be alleviated through generalization. 
Most of the persons who would be directly or indirectly disadvantaged 
by enhanced protection for traditional knowledge are citizens or 
beneficiaries of countries whose disproportionate wealth was derived 
in part from the exploitation of indigenous groups between roughly 
1500 and 1900. But this maneuver, even if persuasive, cannot neutralize 
another troubling feature of the argument: the overwhelming majority 
of both the perpetrators of the exploitation of indigenous groups and 
the victims of that exploitation are now dead. Imposing upon members 
of the current generation—none of whom has ever been given a 
morally significant opportunity to opt out of the benefits of the 
misconduct of their ancestors—a duty to rectify it is more difficult to 
justify than the doctrines mentioned at the outset of this Part that 
implement corrective justice on an individual basis.91  
In sum, this perspective, like the labor-desert theory, provides, at 
best, weak support for overcoming the presumption against 
strengthened legal rights. 
C. Utilitarianism  
The theoretical tradition of utilitarianism might seem a poor 
argument for overcoming the presumption. Utilitarian theorists are 
generally hostile to legal impediments to the free flow of ideas and 
information, on the ground that they needlessly interfere with people’s 
ability to identify and satisfy their preferences efficiently. To be sure, 
utilitarians do recognize one major exception to this stance: intellectual 
property rights, they acknowledge, may be justified when necessary to 
stimulate socially beneficial innovation that otherwise would not occur. 
Much of patent and copyright law is commonly justified on that basis. 
But the desirability of creating intellectual property rights in order to 
stimulate innovation seems inapposite in the context of traditional 
 
 91. Cf. William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Health Care: Developing Drugs 
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 636–37 (2007). 
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knowledge, where the relevant innovative activity by definition has 
already occurred. 
Nevertheless, advocates of enhanced legal protection have sought 
to extract from utilitarian theory three arguments in their favor. First, 
following the lead of an important subgroup of patent law scholars,92 
they contend that giving indigenous groups greater control over the 
knowledge developed under their auspices will incentivize them to 
commercialize that knowledge, which in turn will increase the total 
social benefits of the information.93 Second, they argue that indigenous 
groups will make socially optimal efforts to preserve their traditional 
knowledge only if they are permitted to reap the benefits of the 
commercialization thereof.94 Finally, they suggest that the dismay of 
people who witness the unfair ways in which indigenous groups are 
currently being treated constitutes a large negative psychic externality, 
one which could be eliminated through the extension of greater legal 
rights to those groups.95 
These arguments are ingenious, but none fares well upon close 
examination. Justin Hughes argues persuasively that there is little 
reason to think that indigenous groups would typically be better 
positioned to commercialize their knowledge than the companies that 
often do so without their permission.96 The three controversies 
reviewed in Part I lend support to his contention. Before the arrival of 
the IRD researchers, the indigenous groups in French Guiana had 
made no effort to commercialize the antimalarial potential of Quassia 
amara. The Mowanjum have been slow to commercialize the Wandjina 
 
 92. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 405 (2008); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 710 (2001). 
 93. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 73, 78 (2003) (“If property rights aid in developing and disseminating . . . knowledge, 
then recognizing intellectual property rights in what has already been created is consistent with 
the promotion of progress.”); Peter Drahos, Towards an International Framework for the 
Protection of Traditional Group Knowledge and Practice 9 (Feb. 4–6, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/2004Drahos_tkframework
UNCTAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G3V-RYSQ]. 
 94. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 78 (2002); Hansen, supra note 1, at 775.  
 95. For the foundation of this argument, see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165, 1224 (1967) (“If, then, there are circumstances where a decision not to compensate would 
greatly demoralize men . . . utility, oddly enough, will favor the more liberal compensation 
practice.”).  
 96. Hughes, supra note 1, at 1243–45. 
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images. And American and European rug importers have proven at 
least as capable of commercializing Tibetan rugs as the Tibetan and 
Nepalese weavers who are carrying on the tradition. 
All three controversies also reinforce scholars’ doubts concerning 
the plausibility of the second argument. Documentation of the 
traditional practices of the Galibi, Palikur, Mowanjum, and Tibetan 
weavers has been done by Western ethnobotanists, anthropologists, 
and art historians, not by the members of the groups responsible for 
those forms of traditional knowledge. There is little reason to think 
that extending property rights to the current members of the group 
would augment the already successful efforts to preserve these three 
bodies of knowledge. Nor is there reason to think that in this respect, 
the three controversies reviewed in Part I are idiosyncratic. 
Finally, the third argument rests upon an untested empirical 
proposition: that the total dismay of the observers who witness what 
they see as the unfair denial to indigenous groups of enhanced rights 
to their knowledge is greater than the total dismay that would be 
experienced by other people if they witnessed the interposition of what 
they regarded as unjust legal impediments to public use of that 
knowledge. Until that claim is substantiated, the argument based upon 
psychic externalities has no force. 
In sum, at this point we must conclude that a convincing case for 
strengthening legal rights to traditional knowledge cannot be made on 
utilitarian grounds. 
IV.  CULTURAL THEORY 
The arguments canvassed in the three preceding subsections do 
not exhaust the efforts that have been made to justify enhanced 
protection for traditional knowledge. The scholarly literature contains 
three additional potential justifications: community, distributive 
justice, and privacy. The first of these themes is well developed by 
Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley. The heart of their 
argument is that “[p]eoplehood . . . dictates that certain lands, 
resources, and expressions are entitled to legal protection as cultural 
property because they are integral to the group identity and cultural 
survival of indigenous peoples.”97 The second theme is emphasized by 
 
 97. Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 
YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009); see also Wekundah, supra note 84, at 12 (“Preservation of 
[traditional knowledge] helps to preserve the self identification of people and can ensure the 
continuous existence of indigenous and traditional people.”).  
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Madhavi Sunder in her essay, “The Invention of Traditional 
Knowledge,” in which she argues that legal protection for bodies of 
knowledge developed and constantly modified by indigenous groups 
can improve the economic position of the global poor.98 The third is 
offered by Hughes (in the essay previously mentioned) as a partial 
substitute for the justifications of legal protection for traditional 
knowledge that he persuasively criticizes. Hughes points out that 
unauthorized uses of some forms of traditional knowledge—
specifically, rituals, sanctuaries, or sacred writings that indigenous 
groups have sought to shield from outsiders—might merit legal 
condemnation for many of the same reasons that undergird the long-
established laws governing trade secrecy, protection of confidential 
information, breach of confidence, and invasion of privacy.99  
Each of these arguments is more plausible than the claims, already 
surveyed, rooted in conceptions of labor, corrective justice, or 
utilitarianism. However, to date, the popularity and influence of these 
cultural arguments has been modest. A possible reason is that, unlike 
the three primary arguments, these claims have not been bound 
together into a comprehensive normative framework. As a result, when 
and how much attention should be given to them remains uncertain. 
This Part offers such a framework and then returns to the arguments 
at issue. 
In previous essays, I have described the framework as “cultural 
theory.” Set forth below is a summary of the approach (distilled from 
those earlier essays).100 
The foundation of the approach is the proposition that there exists 
such a thing as human nature, which is hard to discern, but real and 
stable. Because of their nature, people flourish under some conditions 
 
 98. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
97, 103 (2007); see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 142 (1996) (describing the argument in favor of 
more protection of intellectual property in order to improve the economic position of the poor). 
 99. Hughes, supra note 1, at 1253.  
 100. For the essays from which the summary in the text is derived, see WILLIAM W. FISHER, 
III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004) 
[hereinafter FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP]; William W. Fisher, III, The Implications for Law of 
User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010) [hereinafter Fisher, User Innovation]; William W. 
Fisher, III, Recalibrating Originality, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 437 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher, 
Recalibrating Originality]; William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, Reconstructing Fair Use]; Fisher, supra note 83; 
William W. Fisher, III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Fisher, Differential Pricing of Information]. 
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and suffer or atrophy under others. From those observations emerges 
a normative guideline: social and political institutions, including law, 
should be organized so as to facilitate human flourishing. 
Substantial literatures in the fields of philosophy, psychology, 
history, and sociology point toward eight conditions that are especially 
important to human flourishing. The first and most obvious is life itself. 
Flourishing is possible only if you are alive—somewhat more 
specifically, if you are able to live a life of normal length. 
The second, nearly as obvious, is health. Illness impairs 
flourishing. Freedom from physical and psychic pain is one of the 
conditions that contribute to living well.  
Third, a substantial degree of autonomy is important to human 
flourishing. No one, of course, is wholly self-made or self-directed. But 
a life without any measure of self-determination is a life not fully lived. 
Of course, autonomy does not mean freedom from social connections; 
it means, rather, that the bonds and communities through which we 
define ourselves are at least partly chosen, not inherited or coerced. 
One of the findings of recent work in social psychology is that the 
dimension of autonomy that contributes most to well-being is the 
subjective feeling of self-determination, which is only partially 
dependent on the objective number of options one has. Another 
finding is that autonomy not only makes one feel better, but is also 
adaptive. Specifically, autonomous motivations—in other words, 
motivations arising out of voluntary choice—increase job performance, 
particularly when the task at issue is complex and requires creativity. 
The fourth condition conducive to flourishing is engagement, in 
the sense of participating in shaping one’s environment. Engagement 
of this sort can be achieved in at least three settings. The first, 
emphasized by Karl Marx in his early writings, is the workplace; his 
vision of “meaningful work” remains insightful. The leaders of the 
American Revolution (and an important group of contemporary legal 
scholars convinced of the wisdom of their ideology) instead 
emphasized politics; they celebrated a particular style of engagement 
in civic life—altruistic, deliberative, and guided by commitment to the 
welfare of the polity as a whole, rather than by self-interest or factional 
interest. A third, equally important potential arena for engagement is 
culture itself. We live today in a cloud of symbols and images that, like 
our jobs and our polities, all too often seem out of our control. The 
result is cultural alienation analogous to alienation in the workplace. 
Retaking some degree of responsibility and control for the shape of 
that semiotic environment is another way of achieving self-fulfillment. 
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Closely related to engagement is the fifth of the conditions: 
self-expression. Projecting one’s self into or onto the world has long 
been recognized as constitutive. It is on this dimension that the cultural 
theory of copyright veers closest to the personality theory of 
intellectual property. 
The sixth of the conditions, highlighted by recent work in 
psychology, is competence. We feel better and we do better when we 
have the sense that we are capable of performing the tasks we take on. 
Competence does not require that we be certain of success, but that we 
have the requisite talents and skills to succeed. 
The seventh is sociability. We flourish through connection with 
others; we atrophy alone. The vocabulary employed in different 
disciplines to express this age-old insight varies. A philosopher, such as 
Martha Nussbaum, might use the term “affiliation.” The psychologists 
Edward Deci and Richard Ryan use the term “relatedness,” and place 
it on a par with autonomy and competence as a fundamental human 
need. In political theory, the theme finds clearest expression in 
communitarian theory, which emphasizes the role played by group 
membership in the formation and maintenance of a person’s identity. 
Last but not least, human flourishing is facilitated by some degree 
of privacy. Zones, physical or virtual, that are free from scrutiny and 
surveillance are conducive to experimentation and intimacy, and are 
thus crucial to self-fulfillment. 
This list should not be regarded as canonical. Although grounded 
in millennia of reflection and experience, it is still being tested and 
refined. But it provides a reasonably reliable catalogue of the 
underpinnings of a good life. 
A just society would afford all persons access to a life enriched by 
these conditions. To be sure, perfect equality of access is not 
necessary—and indeed may not be possible. But equalization to a 
degree not yet achieved by any country should be our goal. 
Achievement of that objective would require reforming many 
dimensions of our economic, political, and legal systems. The law of 
intellectual property is far from the most important. That said, it is by 
no means inconsequential. In previous essays, I have identified ways in 
which movement in the direction of a just and attractive culture could 
be achieved though reform of five dimensions of intellectual property: 
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the doctrines of fair use and originality in copyright law;101 the 
treatment of user innovation in copyright, patent, and trademark 
law;102 rules governing parallel importation that affect the feasibility of 
differential pricing;103 and the dimensions of patent law that affect the 
availability of life-saving vaccines and medicines.104 In this Essay, I 
apply the same approach to traditional knowledge. 
The legal rules governing controversies of the sorts examined in 
Part I could affect several dimensions of the good life and the good 
society. Controversies like Wandjina Spirit Images make clear that 
traditional knowledge is sometimes central to the identities of 
indigenous groups and that unauthorized use of that knowledge by 
outsiders corrodes those identities. Fidelity to the cultural theory 
outlined above—and, in particular, the importance of sociability to the 
good life—should prompt us to be watchful for such situations and to 
employ the legal system to protect indigenous groups from the pain 
and disorientation that unauthorized use of their knowledge can cause. 
Situations of this sort are most likely to arise when the traditional 
knowledge in question is religious or artistic. It is unsurprising that 
most Mowanjum were “offended and distressed” by the public display 
of representations of Wandjina; those representations violated their 
traditions and beliefs. But threats to group identity (and associated 
pain on the part of members of the group) also sometimes result from 
unauthorized uses of knowledge pertaining to socially beneficial 
harnessing of natural resources. A possible example is “local and 
traditional knowledge” concerning sustainable fishing practices and 
other ways of engaging marine ecological environments.105 
Another way in which cultural theory can illuminate the problem 
of traditional knowledge concerns egalitarianism. Central to the theory 
offered here is a variant of distributive justice. All persons should be 
provided roughly equal access to the preconditions of a good life. 
Enhanced protection of traditional knowledge could help ameliorate 
the radical inequality in the world today in the degree to which the 
members of different groups enjoy such access, specifically by 
 
 101. Fisher, Recalibrating Originality, supra note 100, at 437–38; Fisher, Reconstructing Fair 
Use, supra note 100, at 1661. 
 102. Fisher, User Innovation, supra note 100, at 1474–77. 
 103. Fisher, Differential Pricing of Information, supra note 100, at 16–18. 
 104. Fisher & Syed, supra note 91, at 583.  
 105. See Thomas F. Thornton & Adela Maciejewski Scheer, Collaborative Engagement of 
Local and Traditional Knowledge and Science in Marine Environments: A Review, 17 ECOLOGY 
& SOC’Y 8, 8 (2012). 
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mitigating the economic and social disadvantages from which 
indigenous groups currently suffer. Those disadvantages derive in part 
from the relative poverty of people in regions where indigenous groups 
are overrepresented, particularly Central and South America, sub-
Saharan Africa, and eastern Asia. This geographic concentration is 
most easily seen by comparing the following two maps:106 
 
 106. The source of the former is A Global Map of Indigenous Peoples, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/app/uploads/2014/11/A-global-map-of-indigenous-
peoples.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YUW-9N6H]. The source of the latter is World Development 
Indicators 2017 Maps, WORLD BANK GROUP, https://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi-maps 
[https://perma.cc/GJ3P-ZN2F].  
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Regional Concentrations of Indigenous Groups 
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Regional Concentrations of Poverty 
 
 
This global source of inequality is compounded at the national 
level. Within virtually every country, members of indigenous groups 
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fare worse than the rest of the population with respect to income, 
employment, educational attainment and opportunity, access to safe 
drinking water, vaccination rates, and life expectancy.107 In some 
countries, their positions (both relative and absolute) are improving, 
but in others they are declining.108 
These generalizations are confirmed by case studies of the status 
of indigenous groups in specific countries. For example, the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics reports that, “[i]n 2006, the mean (average) 
equivalised gross household income for Indigenous people was $460 
per week, compared with $740 for non-Indigenous people.”109 
Furthermore, large gaps were evident in all parts of the country, 
ranging from major cities to “[v]ery [r]emote areas.”110 The situation in 
the United States is similar. Roughly 3 million people living in the 
United States are Native Americans. On almost all measures 
pertaining to quality of life, they fare worse than the members of other 
racial or ethnic groups. For example, the poverty rate among Native 
Americans living on reservations is 39 percent; among Native 
American living off reservations, the poverty rate is 26 percent. By 
comparison, the rate for whites is 9 percent; for African Americans, 25 
percent; for Latinos, 23 percent; and for Asian Americans, 13 
percent.111 
In sum, indigenous groups are economically and socially 
disadvantaged. To mitigate these disadvantages, one of the few 
resources upon which these groups might draw is their traditional 
knowledge, and their ability to do so might be enhanced through better 
legal protections. How exactly? It is widely assumed that the most 
effective and efficient mechanism involves benefit sharing, typically 
achieved through license agreements between indigenous groups and 
the companies who wish to put their knowledge to commercial use. 
Some such agreements have worked well, but unfortunately, the 
relationship between IRD and the Palikur and Kalina in French 
 
 107. See GILLETTE HALL & HARRY PATRINOS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Population Characteristics, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 2006, 
AUSTL. BUREAU STATISTICS (July 28, 2011), http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/
B9FFE0FCF1E37147CA2578DB00283CCD?opendocument [https://perma.cc/5SHC-MQPD]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF 
THE NATIVE NATIONS 115 (2008). See generally BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE 
LAW (2008) (using federal law as a lens to analyze the proper place of Indian tribes within the 
American constitutional framework). 
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Guiana is more typical. Thus far, those groups have reaped no benefit 
whatsoever from the benefit-sharing commitment grudgingly made by 
IRD; whether they will ever do so remains uncertain. The same is true 
of the deservedly famous commitment made (similarly under pressure) 
by South Africa’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research to the 
San people in return for permission to commercialize their knowledge 
of the appetite-suppressing power of Hoodia, a plant common in the 
southern countries of Africa.112 
More promising, when feasible, is a strategy under which the 
indigenous group capitalizes on its knowledge by producing and selling 
goods or services embodying that knowledge. The recent history of 
Tibetan carpets provides a good illustration. For the most part, Tibetan 
and Nepalese weavers do not license the rights to manufacture carpets 
using their traditional techniques and designs to western companies; 
instead, as we saw in Part I, they continue to make the carpets 
themselves and sell them for a premium to European and American 
consumers. As Madhavi Sunder shows in her study of the impact of 
geographical indications on traditional handicrafts in India, legal rights 
can powerfully reinforce the capacity of indigenous groups to pursue 
this strategy.113 Not only has this approach proven more reliable than 
licensing, it has the important ancillary benefit of providing long-term 
employment for the members of the group, which in turn increases 
opportunities for the kinds of engagement, control over their 
workplace, and sense of competence that are at least as important as 
income to the conception of the good life that lies at the heart of 
cultural theory.114 
A third advantage, from the standpoint of cultural theory, of 
enhanced protection of traditional knowledge would be augmentation 
of global cultural diversity—a benefit to all persons, not merely the 
members of indigenous groups. The distinctiveness and localism of 
traditional cultural expressions mitigate to some degree the increasing 
 
 112. Roger Chennells, Strengthening Partnership Between States and Indigenous Peoples: 
Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements 3–5 (2012), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/IPeoples/Seminars/Treaties/RogerChennells.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9GZ-
UJ93]. 
 113. Sunder, supra note 98, at 123.  
 114. That intellectual property laws can and should be adjusted to enhance the employment 
opportunities available to poor people, rather than to provide them flows of money, finds strong 
support in the Intellectual Property Policy recently adopted by South Africa. See Dep’t of Trade 
and Indus., Draft Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa, Phase I, 2017, at 
3, www.dti.gov.za/gazzettes/IP_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6TH-ZEZU] (stating that 
intellectual property policy is a core element in generating sustainable and decent jobs).  
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homogenization of most art forms throughout the globe. Legal 
impediments to unauthorized use of such expressions, if successful in 
slowing the pace at which they are swallowed by dominant artistic 
traditions, can benefit everyone. 
On the other side of the ledger is the value of autonomy. 
Restrictions on uses of traditional knowledge do or could limit the 
range of options available to nonmembers of indigenous groups to 
shape and express their identities. Consider, for example, the potential 
implications of tighter limits on unauthorized uses or adaptations of 
Tibetan rugs. For many Westerners, identity is expressed in and 
sustained by the homes we select and shape.115 The centerpiece of the 
aesthetic of many Western homes is the “living room” rug. Freedom to 
choose among extant cultural forms—or to modify and blend them—
when selecting the focal point of one’s living space enhances 
opportunities for self-creation. To be concrete, autonomy is enhanced 
by consumers’ ability to choose and use products like the two depicted 
below, both of which combine dimensions of traditional Tibetan rugs 
with other styles:116 
 
 115. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1 (1993) (exploring 
personality theory, which argues that ownership is bound up with self-constitution). 
 116. For the source of the first, see Gombad D Hand Knotted Tibetan Rug, 
MODERNRUGS.COM, https://www.modernrugs.com/area-rugs/gombad-d-hand-knotted-tibetan-
rug_-_glr_fareedtibetan1751.html [https://perma.cc/C6G4-5ZVX]. For the source of the second, 
see Oka Hand-Knotted Tibetan Wool Rug 6’ x 9’, VIYET, https://viyet.com/lindstrom-rugs-oka-
hand-knotted-tibetan-wool-rug-rug-41225-27684.html [https://perma.cc/T72T-5R57].  
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1560  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
 
  
  
 
Rug sellers exploit, of course, the desire for self-definition through 
home decoration,117 but they are able to do so only because the desires 
are real and durable. Maximizing access to the good life should prompt 
us, if possible, to preserve opportunities to satisfy those desires. 
A better known (and perhaps more appealing) example of the 
same phenomenon involves recent adaptations of Kente cloth in the 
United States. Kente, a distinctively colored cloth featuring bold 
geometric patterns, was developed by the Ewe and Ashanti groups in 
the part of western Africa currently occupied by Ghana and Togo. 
Originally, it was worn only by male rulers, as in the following 
 
 117. An especially forthright example of this marketing strategy can be found on the website 
of one retailer offering rugs of these sorts: “For us it isn’t just about just selling a rug, but helping 
a friend find the perfect piece that’s just the right touch for your home and personality. We want 
to hear a resounding ‘Yes! This is just what I’ve been looking for!’” About Us, RUG IMPORT, 
https://www.rugimport.com/pages/about-us [https://perma.cc/LS8U-MAR5]. 
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photograph of King Osei Tutu II of the Ashanti Kingdom meeting with 
Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands.118 
 
  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of young African 
Americans of both genders began wearing Kente cloth—initially in 
ceremonial settings, such as college convocations and graduations, and 
later in more casual contexts. Some examples are shown on the 
following page:119 
 
 
 118. Patrick Boehler, African Crown Jewels Stolen in Norway, TIME (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/10/12/african-crown-jewels-stolen-in-norway [https://perma.cc/66
X7-8AQ8]. 
 119.  James Padilion Jr., The History and Significance of Kente Cloth in the Black Diaspora, 
BLACK PERSP. (May 22, 2017), https://www.aaihs.org/the-history-and-significance-of-kente-
cloth-in-the-black-diaspora [https://perma.cc/9HTF-6UNM]; Africandimebeautyinside, 
TUMBLR, http://africandimebeautyinside.tumblr.com/post/22162499844 [https://perma.cc/N8F7-
RK3M]. 
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Regina Austin, writing in the early 1990s, explained as follows the 
cultural significance of this trend: “[M]ore and more blacks are 
dressing in whole or in part in African garb as an expression of their 
identity and racial solidarity or their adherence to the ideology of 
Afrocentricity.”120 That many of these uses were inconsistent with the 
 
 120. Regina Austin, “A Nation of Thieves”: Securing Black People’s Right To Shop and To 
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 162; see also ALGERNON AUSTIN, ACHIEVING 
BLACKNESS: RACE, BLACK NATIONALISM, AND AFROCENTRISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
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restrictions traditionally placed upon permissible uses of Kente cloth 
by the Ewe and Ashanti groups is at least partially justified by the large 
social and psychic benefits to the appropriators. Enhanced legal 
impediments to such appropriation would limit the catalogue of 
symbols and materials from which nonindigenous people could fashion 
identities. 
A related value that tilts in the same direction is semiotic 
democracy—an increasingly important form of engagement in which 
people actively participate in the shaping of their cultural 
environments. A good illustration of the potential connection between 
this component of the good life and unlicensed uses of traditional 
knowledge is provided by the history of the tango. In the eighteenth 
century, many Africans from the Bantu region—in the eastern and 
central portions of the continent—were captured and brought as slaves 
to the region of Latin America near the mouth of the Rio Plata. They 
retained and continued to practice many dance traditions, the diversity 
of which reflected their many ethnicities. Over time, those dances 
gradually changed (in part because they became increasingly 
expressive of anger and resistance) and to some extent melded into a 
composite form, which became known as candombe. Variants of 
candombe remained popular among black Uruguayans through 
national independence and the gradual abolition of slavery. In the late 
nineteenth century, the former slaves and their descendants began to 
practice candombe less often, but poor whites in the slums in the 
outskirts of Montevideo picked it up and combined it with aspects of 
the polka from central Europe and the habanera from Cuba. This new 
blend, which came to be known as canyengue, is widely considered the 
first form of the dance we now know as tango. Canyengue, in turn, 
faded in the 1930s, but by then more wealthy Uruguayan whites had 
developed yet another version, known as tango de salon, in which the 
dancers assumed a more upright posture and minimized their vertical 
movements. In 1912, that dance became fashionable in London; the 
following year, it flourished in New York. During the remainder of the 
twentieth century, the popularity of this type of tango in the United 
States was sustained by its incorporation in the instructional programs 
of the Arthur Murray Dance Studios and by its depiction in many 
mainstream films. Meanwhile, in Uruguay and Argentina, an altered 
 
155 (2006) (“In the Afrocentric era, black Americans adopted [kente cloth] for a wide range of 
uses.”). 
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form of candombe was revived and remains popular to this day in 
celebrations of Carnival, and more forms of the tango emerged.121  
Some aspects of this story are tragic, but two are both encouraging 
and relevant to this Essay. First, the dances generated through this 
process are beautiful and have given many people great pleasure. 
Second, the process itself has been highly democratic. Many members 
of many groups have contributed to successive and divergent 
modifications of a cultural form first developed by an indigenous 
group. When considering enhanced legal restrictions on unauthorized 
uses of traditional knowledge, we should be careful not to erect 
barriers to similar processes of democratic cultural hybridization. 
Does identification of these competing considerations leave us in 
equipoise? Not necessarily. That struggles over traditional knowledge 
implicate many competing values does not mean that those values are 
equally salient in all contexts. In some settings, the potential benefits 
of shielding community identities, promoting distributive justice, and 
increasing global cultural diversity seem stronger than the potential 
benefits of maintaining opportunities for self-definition through 
cultural appropriation or facilitating semiotic democracy. In others, the 
reverse seems true. Set forth below is a chart suggesting, roughly, the 
relative strength of these values in some of the controversies discussed 
thus far. 
 
 121. The sources from which this narrative is distilled are SIMON COLLIER, ARTEMIS 
COOPER, MARIA SUSANA AZZI & RICHARD MARTIN, TANGO: THE DANCE, THE SONG, THE 
STORY (1995) (tracing tango’s history); ROBERT FARRIS THOMPSON, TANGO: THE ART 
HISTORY OF LOVE (2005) (exploring tango’s evolution and expression through its global 
representations); Paulo de Carvalho Neto, The Candombe, a Dramatic Dance from Afro-
Uruguayan Folklore, 6 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 164 (1962) (examining the candombe’s survival and 
deformation); Canyengue, Candombe and Tango Orillero: Extinct or Non-existent Tango Styles?, 
TANGO VOICE (Mar. 19, 2010), https://tangovoice.wordpress.com/2010/03/19/canyengue-
candombe-and-tango-orillero-extinct-or-non-existent-tango-styles [https://perma.cc/BCB2-
QE8X] (examining the extent to which historical styles of tango are represented in contemporary 
social tango dancing). 
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The challenge, thus, is to devise a legal system capable of 
responding sensitively to the patterns of values affected by different 
instances of nonpermissive use of traditional knowledge. To that task 
we now turn. 
V.  SOLUTIONS 
For decades, activists have sought to establish through a new 
multilateral agreement (or through amendment of an existing 
agreement) a harmonized global regime that would augment the ability 
of indigenous groups to control uses of their knowledge. Most 
proposals of this sort have taken the form either of a property rule, 
under which all nonpermissive uses of traditional knowledge would be 
forbidden, or a liability rule, under which users of traditional 
knowledge would be obliged to pay fees set by a governmental official 
or tribunal either to the groups from which the knowledge was taken 
or to the nations in which those groups are located.122 The principal 
disadvantage of both types of reform proposal is that they would fail to 
accommodate variations in the salience of the values implicated by 
different controversies. Set forth below are two alternative proposals 
that might do a better job. 
 
 122. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local 
Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 337 (Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, eds., 2005). 
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A. Delegation 
To the TRIPS Agreement123 or to another multilateral intellectual 
property treaty, we might add the following three provisions: 
a) It shall be a defense to a claim of patent infringement 
that the inventor(s), in developing the protected 
product or process, relied substantially upon materials 
or knowledge taken from a member country in 
violation of that country’s laws or from an indigenous 
group in a member country in violation of the laws of 
that group.124 
b) It shall be a defense to a claim of trademark 
infringement that the trademark holder, or the original 
developer of the mark, relied substantially upon 
materials or knowledge taken from a member country 
in violation of that country’s laws or from an indigenous 
group in a member country in violation of the laws of 
that group. 
c) It shall be a defense to a claim of copyright 
infringement that the work in which copyright is 
claimed constitutes a reproduction of a work registered 
within a member country, and that reproduction is not 
authorized by licenses from the country in question and 
from the indigenous group in question. 
The effect of this reform would be to increase the leverage of 
countries in determining the terms on which flora, fauna, medicinal 
knowledge, folklore, and traditional art forms are exploited by others. 
As indicated above, many countries already have laws that deal with 
 
 123. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). 
 124. Some years ago, Martha Field and I proposed a reform of this general sort to deal with 
the problems associated with bioprospecting. See MARTHA FIELD & WILLIAM W. FISHER III, 
LEGAL REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PROPERTY SYSTEMS 256–
57 (2001). Variants of the idea have since appeared in several settings. See Charles R. McManis, 
Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking 
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 563–64 (2003). In a forthcoming 
book, Drugs, Law, and the Global Health Crisis, Talha Syed and I consider the option in depth. 
WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming) (tentative draft available at 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Infection.htm). 
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such matters, but those laws have limited bite because it is so easy to 
violate them with impunity. Adoption of the three provisions would 
give the local laws teeth, not by penalizing violations directly, but by 
exposing violators to the sanction of the forfeiture of their own 
intellectual property rights.  
The countries in which traditional knowledge is currently 
concentrated could be expected to exercise their enhanced powers in 
various ways. Some would likely demand greater compensation from 
individuals and firms using their materials. Others would insist upon 
attribution. Still others would insist that the production of goods 
(drugs, clothing, etc.) based upon traditional knowledge be done in the 
country where that knowledge originated. Finally, some would forbid 
the use of traditional knowledge altogether. Some of these responses 
would likely prove more effective than others, and we would then 
witness additional rounds of legal reform. 
The indigenous groups themselves would likely engage in similar 
experimentation. They would have substantial leverage, because 
violation of their own laws would expose commercial users of their 
knowledge to forfeiture of their intellectual property rights. Some 
indigenous groups would likely use that leverage to extract financial 
concessions, others to insist on attribution, and still others to demand 
that derivative products be produced locally. The companies’ 
responses to these demands—and competition among indigenous 
groups possessing similar bodies of knowledge—would likely prompt 
the groups to adjust their laws over time. 
To be sure, two types of users of traditional knowledge would be 
unaffected by this proposed system: noncommercial users, such as the 
graffiti artists in Perth using the Wandjina Spirit Images, and 
commercial users whose businesses do not depend on intellectual 
property rights, such as the manufacturers of bow ties and earrings 
made of Kente cloth. However, permitting users of these sorts to avoid 
the impact of the proposed regime seems roughly appropriate, because 
in such cases the balance of cultural values seems more often to tilt 
against the potential claims of the indigenous groups. 
The regime sketched above would differ from the Nagoya 
Protocol in three respects. First, it does not specify the ways in which 
countries would control access to and use of the knowledge held by 
indigenous groups within their jurisdictions. Indeed, it would not 
require a member country to adopt and access restrictions at all. It is 
thus designed to accommodate greater variation in the terms of local 
access control. So, for example, it can easily accommodate regimes like 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1568  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
that of Senegal that place “folklore” in the category of domaine public 
payant,125 while the Nagoya Protocol cannot. 
Second, it gives equal weight to local national legislation and to 
the laws (whether traditional or new) of the indigenous groups 
themselves.126 A company making use of traditional knowledge must 
comply with both in order to avoid sanctions. The weight given to the 
laws of indigenous groups is intended both to convey appropriate levels 
of respect and to encourage engagement by the current members of 
such groups in the process of lawmaking and law interpretation—a 
form of engagement celebrated by the cultural theory. 
Third and finally, it relies upon a different mechanism to induce 
compliance. Instead of requiring member countries to adopt and 
implement a system of state sanctions to punish “utilization” of 
traditional knowledge in violation of the laws of the country from 
which it was taken, the proposed regime would rely upon a firm’s 
competitors, most of whom will have strong incentives to act as 
“private attorneys general.” The deterrent effect of the risk of 
forfeiting one’s intellectual property rights is likely to be more effective 
than the risk of incurring a fine. 
The principal hazard of a system of this sort is that it could increase 
the already substantial costs of patent litigation (and, to a lesser extent, 
trademark and copyright litigation) by providing defendants one more 
potential defense. That risk could be mitigated, however, through the 
adoption of a fee-shifting arrangement. For example, a country could 
require defendants who invoke the new defense unsuccessfully to pay 
the extra costs incurred by the plaintiff. Such costs would include 
attorneys’ fees and increased discovery costs. The costs would be 
payable even if the defendant prevailed on a different ground in the 
infringement suit in which the defense were asserted. This would 
discourage frivolous invocations of the new provision, while retaining 
the threat it poses to companies that have indeed violated it.  
B. Mandatory Disclosure—Modified 
Many of the initiatives seeking enhanced legal protection of 
traditional knowledge have included a requirement that companies 
that rely on traditional knowledge when developing products or 
 
 125. See supra note 60. 
 126. For examples of such laws, see Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd [1994] 54 FCR 240 
(Austl.); TERRI JANKE, WIPO, MINDING CULTURE: CASE STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 88 (2001). 
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services disclose that reliance. The first such proposal was advanced in 
1994 by a group of researchers from Peru.127 Since then, similar 
suggestions have been made in many fora—most notably in the long-
standing debates under the auspices of the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.128 
Typically, such proposals take the form of suggestions for 
amendments to application-based intellectual property regimes. In 
some variants of this general approach, failure to comply with the 
disclosure requirement in an application for a patent or other 
intellectual property right would be grounds for denial or invalidation 
of the right. In others, failure to comply would trigger other sanctions 
but not imperil rights granted on the basis of the incomplete 
application.129 
As we saw in Part II, several disclosure requirements of this 
general sort have been adopted by individual countries as part of their 
national intellectual property laws.130 A few have been adopted at the 
regional or multilateral level.131 Most, however, have been rejected. 
Recently, for example, a proposal advanced in the Forty-Ninth Session 
of the WIPO General Assembly,132 which would have mandated that a 
voluntary disclosure principle be included in a new treaty on 
protections for industrial designs, was met with sufficient resistance 
 
 127. See Brendan Tobin, Alternativas a las Legislaciones de Propiedad Intelectual 9 (Sept. 
28–30, 1994) (unpublished manuscript from Reunion Regional Sobre Propiedad Intelectual y 
Pueblos Indigenas), https://www.academia.edu/1315002 [https://perma.cc/5L2J-E5M9]. 
 128. For a review of a wide variety of such proposals, see generally CARLOS CORREA & 
JOSHUA D. SARNOFF, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN 
REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPLICATIONS, UNCTAD (2005); SOUTH 
CENTRE, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF THE SOURCE AND ORIGIN OF BIOLOGICAL 
RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
(2007).  
 129. See WIPO, TECHNICAL STUDY ON DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN PATENT SYSTEMS 
RELATED TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, 8, 26–27 (2004) 
(examining these options). 
 130. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., Swakopmund Protocol, supra note 70, §§ 10, 19.3. 
 132. For details concerning this session, see generally WIPO General Assembly, 49th Sess., 
23rd ordinary sess., WIPO Code WO/GA/49 (Oct. 2–11, 2017) http://www.wipo.int/
meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=43518 [https://perma.cc/CN8Z-XYEA] (listing documents 
from General Assembly session).  
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that it contributed to postponement of a diplomatic conference to 
consider such a treaty.133 
As a mechanism for advancing, sensitively, the diverse 
considerations examined in Part IV of this Essay, the currently 
dominant version of the mandatory-disclosure principle is imperfect. 
However, the strategy would be more promising if modified in four 
respects. 
1. Disconnect The Disclosure Obligation From Intellectual 
Property Regimes.  Instead of requiring applicants for patents, 
trademarks, industrial-design protection, and the like to reveal the 
degree to which they relied on traditional knowledge in creating the 
things for which they are seeking protection, the law could require all 
sellers of products and services to make such disclosures, regardless of 
whether they seek intellectual property protection. This adjustment 
would be less radical than it might appear. In a variety of commercial 
contexts unrelated to applications for intellectual property rights, 
sellers are already obliged to disclose aspects of their products and 
services. For example, in the United States, institutions offering 
residential mortgages must present borrowers with detailed 
information concerning the nature of the financial obligations they are 
incurring;134 sellers of prescription drugs must include in their 
packaging and advertisements warnings concerning the risks 
associated with their products;135 sellers of packaged food must reveal 
the contents thereof;136 and sellers of clothes must include labels that 
indicate, among other things, the materials of which they are made and 
 
 133. See Catherine Saez, WIPO: New 2-Year Mandate For Traditional Knowledge Committee; 
Design Law Treaty Stalls, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2017/10/12/wipo-new-2-year-mandate-traditional-knowledge-committee-design-law-
treaty-stalls/ [https://perma.cc/6MTJ-ENNH ].  
 134. For a comprehensive summary of the state-specific requirements for the disclosure of 
information to applicants for residential mortgages, see State Required Disclosure Matrix—
External Version, LOANDEPOT WHOLESALE (Nov. 9, 2017), https://portal.ldwholesale.com/
portaldocs/yoda/wholesale/State_Specific_Disclosure_Matrix_EXTERNAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XNL8-QNRU]. 
 135. For a thorough presentation of the rules promulgated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) concerning the information that must be contained in the labels placed on 
prescription drugs, see Mary E. Kremzner & Steven F. Osborne, An Introduction to the Improved 
FDA Prescription Drug Labeling, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training/
forhealthprofessionals/ucm090796.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2CQ-UFZ2]. 
 136. The relevant statutes are the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 
52 Stat. 1040 (1938), the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966), 
and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-535 104 Stat. 2353 (1990). 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
2018] TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 1571 
where they were manufactured.137 The penalties for violation of these 
rules can be severe. A general mandatory disclosure obligation for 
products and services drawn from traditional knowledge would impose 
a modest additional regulatory burden on only a small subset of 
companies. 
2. Add An Obligation To Disclose The Extent To Which Members Of 
The Indigenous Group From Which The Knowledge Was Derived Were 
Involved In Manufacture Of The Product In Question Or The Provision 
Of The Service In Question.  This represents an adaptation of the 
regulations that, in the United States, currently govern companies that 
manufacture and sell clothing. As indicated above, such companies 
must reveal, among other things, where their products were 
produced.138 The proposed rule would require revelation of who 
manufactured products derived from traditional knowledge.139 The 
objective of such a requirement, of course, is to put pressure on 
companies to enlist members of indigenous groups in their production 
systems—which, in turn, will lead to the benefits considered in Part IV. 
3. Supplement State-Imposed Sanctions For Violation Of The 
Obligation With A Private Right Of Action.  A disadvantage of 
 
 137. Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (Textile Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 70–70k (2012); 
Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939 (Wool Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68–68j (2012).  
 138. See FTC, Threading Your Way Through the Labelling Requirements under the Textile 
and Wool Acts, FTC (July 2004) https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/threading-your-way-through-labeling-requirements-under-textile#origin 
[https://perma.cc/K4HK-C2AF]:  
Products covered by the Textile and Wool Acts must be labeled to show the country of 
origin.  
• Imported products must identify the country where the products were 
processed or manufactured.  
• Products made entirely in the U.S. of materials also made in the U.S. must 
be labeled ‘Made in U.S.A.’ or an equivalent phrase.  
• Products made in the U.S. of imported materials must be labeled to show the 
processing or manufacturing that takes place in the U.S., as well as the 
imported component.  
• Products manufactured partly in the U.S. and partly abroad must identify 
both aspects. 
 139. U.S. law already contains a provision prohibiting false statements that goods have been 
produced by Native Americans. See 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b) (2012) (creating both a public and a 
private right of action against “a person who, directly or indirectly, offers or displays for sale or 
sells a good . . . in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian product, or the 
product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, resident 
within the United States”). The proposal advanced in the text would raise the bar one notch by 
requiring truthful statements of the degree to which products were produced by members of 
indigenous groups. 
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disconnecting the disclosure obligation from the intellectual property 
system is that it would sacrifice the deterrent effect (discussed in Part 
V.B.I) of fear of loss of intellectual property rights. Punishing 
violations with fines could be reasonably effective. In the United 
States, for instance, the principal penalties for violations of the 
disclosure obligations associated with mortgages, food, drugs, and 
clothing are fines, and those sanctions seem to work reasonably well. 
But they would be even more efficacious if reinforced by the threat of 
civil actions by competitors. Other information-forcing legal regimes—
for example, trademark law and false-advertising law—incorporate 
private rights of action.140 The disclosure duty for traditional 
knowledge could and should do so as well.  
4. Authorize An Administrative Agency To Specify, Through 
Regulations, The Ambit Of The Disclosure Obligation And The Method 
Of Compliance.  Each of the labelling requirements outlined above is 
implemented by an administrative agency, which promulgates and 
periodically revises regulations that give companies detailed guidance 
in how to comply. The Federal Trade Commission bears this 
responsibility with respect to clothing labels,141 the Food and Drug 
Administration does so with respect to prescription drugs and food,142 
and agencies in the state governments do so with respect to residential 
mortgages. A similar system could and should be used to give greater 
precision to a mandatory-disclosure obligation with respect to 
traditional knowledge. Among the questions that would be addressed 
and resolved through such regulations would be: 
 
 140. See, e.g., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014). 
 141. Threading Your Way Through the Labelling Requirements under the Textile and Wool 
Acts, supra note 138.  
 142. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2017) (setting forth the FDA’s regulations concerning 
the information that must be contained in the label placed on prescription drugs); see also FDA 
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research & Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Guidance for 
Industry, Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products—Implementing the 
PLR Content and Format Requirements, FDA (Feb. 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
drugs/guidances/ucm075082.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYK4-WMAL] (explaining the FDA’s labeling 
requirements); FDA Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research & Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research, An Introduction to the Improved FDA Prescription Drug Labeling, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/training/forhealthprofessionals/ucm090796.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2CQ-UFZ2] (same). For a summary of the FDA’s corresponding regulations 
pertaining to food labels, see A Food Labeling Guide: Guidance for Industry, FDA (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM265446.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K936-YHXF]. 
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• What constitutes a “product or service” subject to the 
obligation?143 
• How substantial must have been a company’s reliance on 
traditional knowledge to trigger the obligation? Conversely, at 
what point does a company’s dependence on traditional 
knowledge become sufficiently attenuated that the obligation is 
lifted? 
• How, exactly, must or may the disclosure be made?144 For 
example, must it appear on the product packaging, or would a 
statement on the company’s website suffice? Might companies 
employ a multipart disclosure—for example a simple mark on the 
product or its packaging, which referred purchasers to a registry 
(analogous, perhaps, to the registry for the Lisbon System for the 
International Registration of Appellations of Origin145) where a 
more detailed description of the product’s provenance and the 
company’s employment practices could be found? 
 
 143. Among the many questions that could be addressed by the agency under this heading are 
whether the obligation would extend to the authors of works of literature—fiction or nonfiction—
that describe or represent the cultural or medical practices of indigenous groups. (In conversation, 
Frank Michelman suggested as examples: EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE 
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976) and MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY 
FINN (1884).) Although it might be possible to construe the terms “products” or “services” 
sufficiently broadly to reach such things, the resultant threat to academic and literary freedom 
would be formidable. So the answer should be no. What about works of art—such as Tenodi’s 
sculpture, described in Part I.C.? For much the same reason, the answer would be no. But one of 
the agency’s harder tasks would be to define with some precision the category of “art.” Cf. 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012) (defining “works of visual art” for the purposes of the Visual Artists’ 
Rights Act). 
 144. A growing literature, informed by empirical work associated with behavioral law and 
economics, seeks to identify the characteristics that maximize the effectiveness of disclosures. See, 
e.g., Christine Jolls, Debiasing Through Law and the First Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 
1419–36 (2015) (discussing the “informedness effects of legally required communications”); 
George Loewenstein, Cass R. Sunstein & Russell Golman, Disclosure: Psychology Changes 
Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 405–12 (2014) (explaining “when and why disclosure is likely 
to work or backfire, [and] potential improvements of disclosure policies”); Christine Jolls, 
Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation, 169 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 54, 58–59 (2013) (discussing the effects of health 
warnings required by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009). The 
proposed agency could and should draw on that literature when framing regulations—bearing in 
mind, however, that the disclosure regime proposed here is unusual in two respects: (a) it seeks 
to assist and encourage consumers to act upon their “social preferences,” rather than nudge them 
to avoid products and services that might be bad for their health or finances, and (b) it is aimed 
as much at watchdog groups (who, as we have seen, publicize uses of traditional knowledge they 
deem unfair) as at individual consumers. 
 145. See Lisbon, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en [https://perma.cc/FR23-DC8F]. 
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Some of the modifications outlined above are designed to address 
and resolve ambiguities or weaknesses that critics of mandatory-
disclosure regimes have long stressed. But most of the modifications 
reflect a fundamental difference between the aspirations that have 
emerged from this Essay and the goals of the currently dominant type 
of mandatory-disclosure system. The proposal offered here does not 
seek to prescribe or enforce any particular standard of fair treatment, 
such as the benefit-sharing principle at the heart of the Nagoya 
protocol. It strives instead to bring into public view the kinds of 
information the public at large would need in order to consider what, 
with respect to each idiosyncratic instance of the use of traditional 
knowledge, would constitute fair treatment. In that way, the proposal 
aspires to provoke public attention to and discussion of such matters 
and, ultimately, to prompt a commercially significant subset of 
consumers to act upon their ethical conclusions. Why? Partly because 
such deliberations are good in themselves, but primarily because, as we 
saw through our examination of the case studies in Part I, the 
companies that sell products and services incorporating traditional 
knowledge are usually responsive to consumers’ expressed ethical 
preferences. The long-term result of adoption of this proposal will thus 
be to alter the companies’ behavior for the better.  
Like the system outlined in Part V.A., this proposal contemplates 
that the nations and indigenous groups from which traditional 
knowledge is taken would be active participants in the new regime, 
rather than mute beneficiaries of it. Specifically, such nations and 
groups can be expected to enhance and inflect the ethical debates 
spurred by the companies’ disclosures with public statements of their 
own expectations of fair treatment—in much the same way that the 
Mowanjum representatives did with respect to the Wandjina graffiti 
and that the Organization of Indigenous Nations in Guiana did with 
respect to IRD’s use of the knowledge developed by the Galibi and 
Palikur concerning the medicinal value of quassia amara.146 The stances 
taken by the groups will likely vary. Some might insist upon benefit-
sharing arrangements, others might demand employment for current 
members of the group, others might insist upon respectful treatment of 
 
 146. This process would be loosely analogous to the increasingly common practice by which 
companies involved in standard-setting organizations announce their own understandings of “fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” licensing terms. See Jorge L. Contreras, From Private 
Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Framework Governing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 211 (2017). 
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traditional symbols or rituals, others might request only appropriate 
attribution, and so forth.  
Of course, the groups’ capacity to demand such concessions would 
not be unlimited. Only if the expectations of fair treatment they 
announced resonated with the public’s evolving attitudes—and, in 
particular, with the views of the consumers of the products or services 
at issue—would companies feel obliged to comply with their demands. 
Over time, a dialectic would likely emerge: indigenous groups and the 
nations in which they currently are located would request concessions 
from the companies making use of their knowledge; watchdog groups, 
the media, and consumers would respond favorably to some such 
requests (and thus press the companies to comply) but would respond 
unfavorably to others; the groups would adjust their demands 
accordingly; and so forth. The net result would be an episodic public 
conversation concerning the appropriate scope and application of the 
values set forth in Part IV and a gradual evolution of commercial 
practices to track the evolving views of significant subsets of 
consumers.  
Critical to this process, of course, is the willingness of consumers 
not merely to express support for norms of fair treatment, but to alter 
their purchasing behavior when those norms are violated. Would they? 
Considerable reassurance on that score can be gleaned from recent 
studies of consumers’ responses to “Fair Trade” labels when attached 
to products like coffee or clothing. Such labels certify that the farmers 
or employees who produced the products were compensated and 
treated according to standards promulgated by a consortium of 
organizations dedicated to their protection.147 Surveys in which 
consumers are asked whether they would be willing to pay more for (or 
buy more of) products that meet such standards consistently elicit 
strong positive responses.148 The same is true of their willingness to pay 
 
 147. See 10 Principles of Fair Trade, WORLD FAIR TRADE ORG., https://wfto.com/our-path-
fair-trade [https://perma.cc/9RAQ-L8E2]. Although most of the companies that seek to profit by 
publicizing their adoption of fair labor standards use the convenient device of the “Fair Trade” 
label, a few adopt and pledge obedience to even higher standards. See, e.g., EVERLANE, 
https://www.everlane.com/about [https://perma.cc/JJP6-RB3N] (explaining Everlane’s ethical 
practices). 
 148. See, e.g., Shareen Hertel, Lyle Scruggs & C. Patrick Heidkamp, Human Rights and Public 
Opinion: From Attitudes to Action, 143 POL. SCI. QUARTERLY 443, 443, 448–49 (2009) (describing 
research indicating that people “are willing to pay more for ethically produced goods” in order to 
promote the right to a minimum standard of living); Patrick De Pelsmacker, Liesbeth Driesen & 
Glenn Rayp, Do Consumers Care About Ethics? Willingness to Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 363, 375 (2005) (explaining results indicating that a fair-trade label is almost as 
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premiums for “green” products—that is, those produced in ways that 
minimize damage to the environment.149 But skeptics have argued, 
plausibly, that such responses cannot be trusted, because respondents 
will be inclined to say what they think the questioners want to hear. 
Recently, however, several empirical studies have demonstrated that 
substantial groups of consumers do indeed behave in the predicted 
fashion when given the chance.150 That finding strongly suggests that 
some consumers, if offered products or services visibly associated with 
unfair treatment of impoverished indigenous groups, would balk—
which, in turn, would prompt the companies to reform their ways. 
But that comforting finding suggests, ironically, a different 
objection to the proposal offered here. The fact that coffee bearing a 
 
important to consumers as flavor); Five Key Findings from Nielsen’s Global Survey of Corporate 
and Social Responsibility, GRIFFIN & CO., http://griffinco.com/5-key-findings-from-nielsens-
global-survey-of-corporate-and-social-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/VV59-MKKJ] (indicating 
the majority of people “will pay extra for products and services from companies committed to 
positive social and environmental impact”). 
 149. See, e.g., Sarah Butler, Ethical Shopping Growing in Popularity, Survey Suggests, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/19/ethical-
shopping-growing-popularity-fairtrade [https://perma.cc/EZZ3-KMMY] (finding that ethical 
shopping is growing in popularity in the United Kingdom); Jessica Lyons Hardcastle, Consumers 
Will Pay More Money for ‘Sustainable’ Products, ENVTL. LEADER (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.environmentalleader.com/2017/01/consumers-will-pay-more-money-for-
sustainable-products/ [https://perma.cc/7G3U-RVP7] (“Thirty three percent of respondents to 
the survey would pay $10 more, while 40% would pay at least a $5 premium.”); Mehdi Miremadi, 
Christopher Musso & Ulrich Weihe, How Much Will Consumers Pay to Go Green?, MCKINSEY 
QUARTERLY (Oct. 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-
resource-productivity/our-insights/how-much-will-consumers-pay-to-go-green 
[https://perma.cc/5BES-9CUE] (finding that many people will pay more to “go green,” but only 
up to a certain point). 
 150. The most impressive of those studies consisted of a “field test,” conducted in twenty-six 
stores of a U.S. grocery store chain, of consumers’ responses to coffee sold with and without “Fair 
Trade” labels. There were two principal findings. First, “[s]ales of the two most popular bulk 
coffees sold in stores rose by almost 10% when the coffees carried a Fair Trade label as compared 
to a generic placebo label.” Jens Hainmueller, Michael J. Hiscox & Sandra Sequeira, Consumer 
Demand for the Fair Trade Label: Evidence from a Multi-Store Field Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 242, 242 (2015). Second, the more upscale the coffee, the greater the willingness to pay 
for fair labor practices—as shown by the fact that sales for the higher priced Fair-Trade-labeled 
coffee “remained fairly steady when its price was raised by 8%” while demand for the lower-
priced Fair-Trade-labeled coffee “was more elastic: a 9% price increase in its price led to a 30% 
decline in sales.” Id. For other studies leading to similar conclusions, see generally Daniel W. 
Elfenbein & Brian McManus, A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay 
More for Charity-Linked Products, 2 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL. 28 (2010); Ibon Galarraga & Anil 
Markandya, Economic Techniques to Estimate the Demand for Sustainable Products: A Case 
Study for Fair Trade and Organic Coffee in the United Kingdom, 4 ECONOMIA AGRARIA Y 
RECURSOS NATURALES 109 (2004); Mario F. Teisl, Brian Roe & Robert L. Hicks, Can Eco-
Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 339, 
351–55 (2002). 
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“Fair Trade” label can be sold for more than coffee lacking such a label 
casts doubt upon the need for a new information-forcing legal rule. If 
compliance with consumers’ social preferences enables companies to 
raise their prices, why must we adopt a disclosure requirement with 
respect to traditional knowledge? Why not just rely on the companies’ 
recognition of their self-interest to prompt them to acknowledge 
voluntarily their indebtedness to traditional knowledge—and then to 
treat the relevant indigenous group more fairly? As we saw in Part I.C, 
the upscale sellers of Tibetan carpets have already taken this tack. 
Perhaps we should wait for companies in other lines of business to 
learn from their example. 
Three considerations, in combination, suggest that it would be 
unwise to trust companies to recognize and exercise their power to do 
well by doing good. First, in most circumstances it is easier for 
companies to conceal both from consumers and from watchdog groups 
their reliance on traditional knowledge than it is to conceal unfair labor 
practices. Second, the diversity of interests and values at stake in 
disputes over traditional knowledge impedes efforts by NGOs to 
develop a single label and an associated set of “fair practices” to which 
companies could voluntarily conform and that consumers could then 
recognize and reward.151 Finally, the ethical questions raised by uses of 
traditional knowledge are much less familiar to the general public than 
the analogous issues presented by exploitative labor practices or 
disrespect for the environment. Given a choice, most companies 
currently making covert use of traditional knowledge would probably 
prefer to let sleeping dogs lie than to alert their consumers to their 
conduct, hoping to profit subsequently from their ability to capitalize 
on consumers’ newly energized social preferences. These 
generalizations are lent credence by the fact that, even after decades of 
academic and governmental attention to the puzzle of traditional 
knowledge, the sellers of Tibetan carpets are highly atypical in their 
willingness to acknowledge (indeed, trumpet) their fair treatment of 
the groups they rely upon. The bottom line is that using consumers to 
pressure companies to behave better is only likely to work if the law 
compels the companies to disclose information that will catalyze the 
process. 
 
 151. That diversity substantially explains the failure of the effort by the National Indigenous 
Arts Advocacy Association in Australia to popularize an “Indigenous Label of Authenticity.” See 
Drahos, supra note 93, at 32. 
FISHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:33 PM 
1578  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1511 
CONCLUSION 
Two circumstances, in combination, exacerbate the difficulty of 
developing a sensible legal response to nonpermissive uses of 
traditional knowledge: many competing values are implicated by such 
uses, and the relative strength of those values varies sharply by context. 
The Essay seeks to bring some order to the field, first by distilling from 
a cultural theory of intellectual property a normative framework for 
identifying and weighing the values at stake, and then by offering two 
alternative reform proposals, either of which could do better than the 
proposals currently on the table at reconciling those goals. 
 
